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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1940-1941'
PERSONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

N People v. Village of Wilmette/ the Supreme Court
blocked upon technical grounds an attempt upon the part
of the Village of Wilmette to incorporate within its arid confines the tiny oasis of "No Man's Land." This unincorporated triangular tract of some twenty-two acres is wedged in
between Wilmette and Kenilworth on the shore of L a k e
Michigan. In 1939, the General Assembly passed a "general"
statute, actually describing the tract in question by every
means short of metes and bounds, authorizing annexation by
any contiguous municipality.' The court invalidated the statute upon the sole ground that the subject matter was not
included in the title.' One cannot but wonder whether, if the
statute had not been invalid for this reason, it would not
1 The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past year,
but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases and
developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the
judicial year, embracing from 374 Ill. 1 to 376 Ill. 485; from 305 IIl. App. 627 to
310 Ill. App. 485; and from 111 F. (2d) 913 to 119 F. (2d) 784.
2 375 Ill. 420, 31 N.E. (2d) 774 (1941).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 408b: "Whenever, any contiguous unincorporated
territory, containing thirty (30) acres or less is bounded on one side by any navigable body of water and otherwise is wholly bounded by two or more cities, villages
or incorporated towns, and there were not more than 200 qualified voters residing
therein on June 1, 1939, such territory may be annexed by any one of such cities,
villages or incorporated towns by the passage of an ordinance to that effect."
[Punctuation sic].
4 The act was entitled: "An Act to provide for the annexation of unincorporated
territory which is entirely surrounded by incorporated territory." The tract in
question here, of course, was bounded on one side by water.
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have been invalidated as "special legislation," particularly
in view of the inability under the general statute5 of a municipality to incorporate territory without the consent of a majority of the owners.
Upon the facts of the instant provision a very interesting
dilemma might arise. Not only might territory incorporated
thereunder subsequently divorce itself from the municipality
under the Disconnection Act of 1935,6 allowing disconnection
under certain circumstances of an area of twenty acres or
more, but certain territory granted disconnection under the
latter act might thereafter be reincorporated under the special statute. This process of incorporation and disconnection
might conceivably go on ad infinitum. It should be noted in
this connection that the application of the Disconnection Act
of 1935 has been broadened and clarified during the year by
the Supreme Court in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Village of
South Pekin,7 by permitting to be included within the definition of area several "tracts" owned by different parties, and
without regard to their use.
The ill-fated Chicago Board of Education tax anticipation warrants of 1929 came before the Illinois Supreme
Court once more, and probably for the last time, in Leviton
v. Board of Education of City of Chicago.8 No orderly method
of liquidation having been prescribed in either the statute or
ordinance authorizing the issuance of the warrants, the
Board of Education paid off warrants in full as presented
as rapidly as it received its 1929 taxes. The taxes so collected fell some $10,000,000 short of retiring all of the warrants.
A statute' authorizing the issuance of bonds to raise the difference was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1935 as not
being for a corporate purpose, 10 inasmuch as the warrants
were a lien only upon the 1929 taxes and not a general obligation of the Board of Education. Subsequently many unappealed judgments were taken against the Board by the holders of the unpaid warrants, and finally in 1937, the legisla5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
6 IM. Rev. Stat. 1941,
7 374 IMl. 431, 29 N.E.
8 374 IMl. 594, 30 N.E.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933,
10 Berman v. Board
465 (1935).

Ch. 24, §§ 7-1 et seq.
Ch. 24, §§ 7-40 to 7-43.
(2d) 590 (1940).
(2d) 497 (1940); note, 36 IlM.L. Rev. 216.
Ch. 122, §§ 327i-327p.
of Education of the City of Chicago, 360 IMl. 535, 196 N.E

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1940-1941

ture again authorized the issuance of bonds,' doubtless feeling that such bonds might be valid because the judgments
would constitute general obligations of the Board. These
bonds were invalidated in the present decision. The Court
reiterated its position in the Berman case, and avoided the
effect of the judgments by holding them to be "presumptively fraudulent," since permitted upon a theory already disapproved by the Supreme Court. Assuming that the position
of the court is correct in rejecting theories based upon tort,
upon the ground that the school boards are "quasi-municipal" corporations, and as such not liable in tort, there would
still seem at least two well-supported theories upon which a
just result might have been reached. A quasi-contractual
theory might have been employed, inasmuch as the Board
of Education has had the use of the money, and unjust enrichment has resulted. An even simpler and more logical
theory would seem to be that uniformly, applied in Illinois to
similar cases involving special assessment bonds, i.e., that
the Board of Education received the 1929 taxes as a trustee,
obligated to distribute the same ratably among the holders
of the warrants. 2 This was the theory applied by the Circuit
Court of Appeals with respect to these same warrants. The
holders of some of these warrants were given relief by that
court in Board of Education of City of Chicago v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co.,' 3 and an accounting by the Board is still in
progress in that litigation. The fear of the Illinois Supreme
Court seemed to be that the method here employed might be
used as a device for avoiding statutory debt limitations - a
fear which tends to dwindle when one remembers that legislative authority is a prerequisite to the issuance of bonds
such as those in issue. One wonders if even greater danger
may not lurk in the cavalier brushing aside of judgments as
"presumptively fraudulent." Since there would seem to be
little difference between expenditure of money for other than
a public purpose and the granting of unconstitutional tax
immunity, this latest decision might seem an ominous rever11 IMI.Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 122, §§ 327.62-327.67.
12 See Cook v. City of Staunton, 295 Ill. App. 111, 14 N.E. (2d) 696 (1939); Viehweg v. City of Mount Olive, 298 Ill. App. 412, 19 N.E. (2d) 211 (1939); Harrold v.
City of East St. Louis, 197 Ill. App. 121 (1915); and Trustees of Schools of Twp. 24
v. Trustees of Schools of Twp. 25, 81 Ill. 470 (1876).
1s 88 F. (2d) 462 (1937).
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sal of the attitude of the Court toward res judicata taken in
Brown v. Jacobs.4
An excellent statement of the trust theory above referred
to will be found in Friedman v. City of Chicago,15 finally
released by the Supreme Court just six days before the decision in the Leviton case:
Under the Local Improvement Act in this State the proceeds of
special assessments are trust funds for the payment of the bonds issued
for the cost of an improvement and a bondholder whose bonds are past
due is entitled, in equity, to have his pro rata share of the installment
that has been collected paid to him with interest.

The issue litigated in that case, however, was not the trust
fund theory, which passed unquestioned, but the problem of
whether or not retrospective effect would be g i v e n
the amendment to the Local Improvement Act permitting
the payment of special assessments with bonds even where
the amounts of bonds exceed the amounts of assessments
and interest. The court held that the amendment was inapplicable to bonds issued prior to the effective date of the
amendment.
Several cases involving elections, and election officials
and their tenures may be worthy of notice. In Stockholm
v. Daly, 6 the Supreme Court held that the statute 17 requiring ballots to be preserved for six months and then destroyed,
provided that if any election contest is then pending the ballots shall not be destroyed until the contest is finally decided,
does not make mandatory the destruction of the ballots at
the end of the six months' period where a number of prosecutions for violations of the election laws are pending, even
though no election contests have been filed. The attitude of
the court was that the destruction of the ballots under such
circumstances might seriously hinder, if not prevent, the
proper prosecution of the contempt charges. Two justices
dissented, emphasizing the importance of averting all threats
to the secrecy of the ballot, and expressing the opinion that
the writ of mandamus should issue to permit the destruction
of the ballots not actually involved in the pending cases.
14
15
16
17

367 Ill. 545, 12
374 IMl. 545, 30
374 I. 441, 29
fll. Rev. Stat.

N.E.
N.E.
N.E.
1941,

(2d) 10 (1937); note, 17 CHICAGo-KmNT LAw REVMIW 64.
(2d) 36 (1940).
(2d) 1010 (1940).
Ch. 46, §§ 59 and 316.
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In quo warranto proceedings brought by a defeated candidate, the Appellate Court, in People v. Quilici,18 refused to
hold invalid an election to fill a vacancy on the Municipal
Court of Chicago. The Municipal Court Act requires such
vacancies to be filled at the next regular election. 19 Inasmuch as the only positions to be filled at the election were
six judgeships on the Superior Court and the vacancy in
question, and there was no contest in the Superior Court
election, the Board of Election Commissioners, twenty-five
days before the election, reduced the number of polling
places from 3,648 to 648. The court rejected the contention
that this was not the next regular "election" because an
election requires a contest; sustained the propriety of the
reduction in the number of polling places; held that the constitutional right to vote of anyone residing within the precinct for thirty days next preceding the election had not been
abridged; and indicated that at all events a candidate cannot
stand by and take his chances at the polls and then attack
the election if he is unsuccessful.
In People v. Lipsky," the Appellate Court was called
21
upon to determine whether or not the City Civil Service Act
22
impliedly repeals the provisions of the City Election Act
empowering city boards of election commissioners to appoint
their employees with county court's consent and approval.
The court decided in the negative, i.e., that election employees are not subject to civil service, indicating that there was
no necessary repugnancy between the two statutes, and
stressing the fact that repeal by implication is not favored.
In People v. City of Chicago, 3 the Supreme Court had
occasion to pass upon a novel problem of municipal tenure.
Petitioners in mandamus were appointed July 10, 1931, as
members of the board of examiners of stationary engineers
for the City of Chicago. The appropriation ordinances of 1932
and 1933 reduced the compensation of such members below
that appropriated in 1931. The present suit brought for the
18 309 I1. App. 466, 33 N.E. (2d) 492 (1941).

19 Ill.
20 307
21 Ill.
22 Il1.
23 374

Rev. Stat. 1941,
IU. App. 137, 30
Rev. Stat. 1941,
Rev. Stat. 1941,
Ill. 157, 28 N.E.

Ch. 37, § 364.
N.E. (2d) 502 (1940).
Ch. 24 , §§ 39 et seq.
Ch. 46, § 159 et seq.
(2d) 93 (1940).
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purpose of compelling the City to pay the difference, was
based upon the constitutional prohibition2 4 against diminution during such term of a municipal officer who is elected
or appointed for a definite term of office. By general ordinance, the City had fixed at two years the terms of officers
not otherwise determined.2 5 The portion of the Cities and
Villages Act providing for the creation of such offices also
authorized their discontinuance by the council at the end of
any fiscal year.2 6 The act also provided:
The compensation of all officers shall be by salary, as fixed in the annual appropriation bill, by the City Council, and the compensation of no
27
officer shall be altered during the same fiscal year.

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior
Court granting mandamus and held that
excepting officers whose terms of office and salaries are fixed by statute, the legislature intended by the sections quoted above, to stabilize
the salaries of officers of cities and villages for only the fiscal year.

The last session of the General Assembly passed the Revised Cities and Villages Act, to go into effect January
1, 1942.28 No analysis of the new act will be attempted here.
It may be stated, however, that this body of statutory material has been substantially reduced in volume and the whole
rationally classified into eighty-seven separate "articles."
Apparently, duplicatory and overlapping provisions, as well
as innumerable corrective acts and special acts cast in general form, have been eliminated. These physical gains will
be sufficiently appreciated by anyone who has been compelled to work with this confused body of materials. Improvements of a less mechanical type will doubtless be disclosed
for appreciation by use of the new revision and, it is hoped,
29
by a study and analysis beyond the scope of this survey.
24 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 11: "The fees, salary or compensation of no municipal officer who is elected or appointed for a definite term of office, shall be
increased or diminished during such term."
25 Rev. Code of Chicago of May 27, 1931, § 644.
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 85.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 172.
28 Laws 1941, Vol. 2, p. 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, §§ 1-1 to 87-4.
29 In addition, a number of miscellaneous amendments and changes of a minor
character have been made in the old cities and villages statutes. Laws 1941, Vol. 1.
p. 319 et seq.
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CORPORATIONS

The validity of Section 52 of the Business Corporations
Act,"0 permitting a corporation to amend the articles of incorporation, was involved in Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Company,3 particularly insofar as the provision affects the right

of a corporation organized under an earlier statute to create
new classes of stock having rights and preferences prior and
superior to classes of stock already outstanding. The conditional nature of the corporate contract, not only as between
the corporation and the state, but also as between the
corporation and the shareholder, was recognized, and, in
view thereof, it was held that an amendment properly
adopted pursuant to said Section 52 did not interfere with the
"vested rights" of a holder of preferred stock, and hence that
the statute was not unconstitutional.
An interesting problem respecting the right to vote corporate shares of stock held by co-trustees was involved in
People ex rel. Courtney v. Botts, 2 in which case the shares
belonging to the decedent had been devised in trust to a corporate and a personal trustee. The shares had been
duly transferred on the corporation's books into the names
of such persons jointly.3 It was held that, at least so far as
quo warranto proceedings were concerned, the voting of
such stock required the joint action of both trustees, and any
attempt by one of them to vote all or any part of the shares
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.52.
31 374 Ill. 364, 29 N.E. (2d) 502 (1940). The corporation, organized in 1919,
originally possessed a capital structure consisting of cumulative preferred stock
and common stock. In 1936, apparently in order to remove unpaid accumulations
on the preferred, the corporation amended the articles to create a new class of
prior preferred stock and offered the same, by way of exchange, for cancellation
of the old preferred stock and accumulations. Plaintiff, a preferred stockholder,
sued to have such amendment declared null and void and to enjoin proceedings
thereunder. Held: complaint dismissed for want of equity. Note, 8 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 134.
32 376 IlM.476, 34 N.E. (2d) 403 (1941). The action incidentally involved the problem whether quo warranto proceedings to determine the right of a corporate
director to hold office could become moot by reason of the expiration of the term
of such office pending appeal. The rule as applied in mandamus proceedings, illustrated by People ex rel. Lawrence v. Village of Oak Park, 356 Ill. 154, 190 N.E. 286
(1934), and in certiorari proceedings, National Jockey Club v. Illinois Racing
Commission, 364 fI1. 630, 5 N.E. (2d) 224 (1936), was rejected as not applicable to
quo warranto, whether affecting public or so-called private rights; hence the
proceedings were not mcot.
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.30.
30
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was a nullity. The unusual feature of the case, however, concerned the effect to be given to a provision in the will which
gave the corporate trustee the power "to vote so much, and
so much only, of the stock . . . as may be sufficient to elect
one director. . . . "" The court refused to consider the effect
of such provision in the quo warranto proceedings,3 5 holding the corporate records were controlling on the legal right
to vote. In the light of the current practice of corporation
stock transfer officials to insist upon having certified or
authenticated copies of all documents showing the right
of the fiduciary to hold shares in such capacity," it is not
readily apparent how the fact of issuance of shares in the
name of the trustee could override the effect of provisions in
the trust instrument or will, if otherwise valid, limiting or
affecting the power of such fiduciary to vote such shares. 7
The exclusive control over corporate dissolution proceedings vested in the Attorney General by Section 82 of the
Business Corporations Act, 38 which includes the power
to stipulate to vacate orders entered therein, was vindicated
by People ex rel. Cassidy v. James Karban & Company, Inc.39 In that case, after decree of dissolution had been
entered, the corporation, through the chairman of the board
of directors, moved to vacate such decree on the ground of
lack of personal service, which motion was granted, apparently without objection of the Attorney General.4 0 Thereupon
a stockholder in the corporation, upon intervening petition,
charged that the corporation director who had so moved was
without authority to act in that fashion, was in fact acting in
opposition to the stockholders who had determined on liqui34 376 Ill.
476 (at p. 482), 34 N.E. (2d) 403 (at p. 405).
35 It was indicated that such problem should be left for a court having competent
jurisdiction-presumably in a suit to construe the will, or on application of the
trustee for directions. 376 Ill.
476 (at p. 484), 34 N.E. (2d) 403 (at p. 406).
36 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.30, requires transfer to the trustee in order to
allow the fiduciary to vote.
37 That such provisions may render the corporation liable for an unauthorized
transfer of shares, see Wooten v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 128 N.C. 119, 38 S.E. 298,
56 L.R.A. 615 (1901).
38 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.82.
39 307 Ill. App. 310, 30 N.E. (2d) 149 (1940).
40 In an answer to the intervening petition, the Attorney General indicated that
a part payment of the unpaid franchise taxes, the cause assigned for dissolution,
had been made and that the balance would be forthcoming if the order vacating
the decree was permitted to stand. 307 Ill.App. 310 (at p. 318), 30 N.E. (2d) 149
(at p. 152).
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dation. The stockholder sought to reinstate the original decree of dissolution. The challenge of the Attorney General to
such intervening petition, on the ground aforesaid, was upheld, and the intervenor was directed to seek appropriate
relief elsewhere.4
The right of a creditor of a closed bank to enforce the
superadded liability of a stockholder therein still presents
problems, as was seen in Burnett v. West Madison State
Bank,42 in which, some six years after closing of a consolidated bank,4 3 an attempt to collect such liability was met by
the defense of the statute of limitations. 4 While recognizing
that the enforcement of such liability may be defeated by
too long a delay, the court pointed out that the cause of action
against the stockholder, though resting upon a separate constitutional foundation,4 5 is, nevertheless, so connected with
the transaction which creates the relationship of creditor
against the bank itself, as to be enforcible against the stockholder just as long as the same could be regarded as
actionable against the corporation and no longer. Where different provisions for limitation might exist as to the several
creditors,4" the responsibility is on the stockholder sued
to show, by affirmative defense,47 which of the several provisions applies. The effect of the decision, insofar as it provides a guide to future litigation, has been considerably altered by a new limitation statute,4 8 enacted in 1941, which pur41 It is difficult to see how a minority stockholder, such as the intervenor appears
to be, could secure relief, inasmuch as voluntary dissolution proceedings under
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.75, may be undertaken only upon consent of all
the stockholders, or, under ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.76, only upon resolution first adopted by the board of directors with subsequent approval thereof by
the vote of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares.
42 375 Ill. 402, 31 N.E. (2d) 776 (1941), reversing 305 Ill. App. 113, 26 N.E. (2d)
881 (1940).
43 The creditor's claim was against a bank which had ceased to accept deposits
on November 12, 1929, having then transferred its assets and liabilities to another
institution which did not close until June 11, 1931. Neither acceptance of dividends
in liquidation of the latter, nor long delay was regarded as sufficient to show a
novation releasing the stockholders of the former institution.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 16, which fixes a five-year period on all civil
actions not otherwise provided for.
45 Ill. Const. 1870, Art XI, § 6.
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, §§ 15 and 16.
47 A motion to strike the complaint and to dismiss the suit filed under Section 48
of the Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 172, was regarded as insufficient in the instant case in the absence of an affirmative showing on the face of
the complaint that such cause was in fact barred and no supporting affidavit,
introducing such matter, was presented.
48 Laws 1941, Vol 1, p. 272; IMl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 16 , §§ 6a-6h.
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ports to establish a one-year limitation on actions to recover
the superadded liability, whether based on claims already
in existence or which may mature in the future. If constitutional, the new act apparently relieves former stockholders, whose shares are transferred more than one year
prior to closing of the defunct bank, from the shadow of liability which has hung over them hitherto.4 9 Even in the absence of such limitations, the provisions of the Administration Act regarding claims against deceased stockholders' estates, 50 together with the discharge of such administrator or
executor after due administration, will serve as an effective
bar to the enforcement of such superadded liability against
the estate under the decision in Lewis v. West Side Trust &
Savings Bank."
Two other decisions may be worthy of brief mention. In
Highway Mutual Casualty Company v. Stern,5' an opportunity was presented to apply Section 8 of the Business Corporations Act" dealing with the defense of ultra vires, but the
court relied on an earlier decision5 4 and, reaching the same
result as the statute, rejected such defense where the transaction was not intrinsically illegal and had been fully performed by the person suing. In so holding, however, the court
permitted recovery by an assignee for premiums under a
contract of insurance issued by a business corporation which
had not been organized under, nor had complied with, the
provisions of the Insurance Code. 55 While the latter statute
was inapplicable in the instant case, since the contract had
been issued prior to 1937, the decision should be analyzed
carefully to prevent it from becoming a precedent for future
recoveries in similar, but more recent, situations. In Frank49 The act does not purport to affect the existing limitation statutes as between
the creditor and the banking institution. Laws 1941, p. 274; Ini. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch.
16 , §6d.
50 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 356.
51 376 Ill. 23 (at p. 45), 32 N.E. (2d) 907 (at p. 918) (1941). Certain of the
defendants were sued in their capacities as executors, though they had theretofore
duly administered the estates of their decedents and had been formally discharged.
The decree, assessing the liability and requiring payment thereof in due course of
administration, was reversed on the ground that, upon such discharge, the executor
is "functus officio" and cannot be sued in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake.
52 306 Ill. App. 506, 29 N.E. (2d) 281 (1940); note, 29 Ill. B.J. 263.
53 Il.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.8.
54 Prudential Insurance Co. v. Richmond, 364 Ill. 234, 4 N.E. (2d) 76 (1936).
55

IMl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 73, § 733.

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR

1940-1941

lin Process Company v. Western Franklin Process Company,56 the question arose of the right of the parent corporation to share as a creditor in the assets of the subsidiary undergoing liquidation on an equal footing with other creditors.
It was contended that the claim of the parent corporation should be subordinated on the ground the subsidiary was
a mere instrumentality of the former, but the court refused
to apply such rule in the absence of a showing that the other
creditors had suffered some special injury by reason of the
acts of the parent corporation, and held that the latter was
entitled to participate on a parity with the other creditors.
While the general structure of the Business Corporations
Act has been left undisturbed, the recent General Assembly
has made some minor amendments thereto. Thus Section 6
now empowers the corporation to acquire its own shares, if
redeemable, by either redemption or by purchase at not to
exceed the redemption price, 57 provided such purchase does
not reduce the remaining assets below the amount required
by Section 58.58 When shares are so acquired, they shall not
be voted at any meeting, nor counted in determining the
total number of outstanding shares, though, if held by the
corporation in a fiduciary capacity, such limitation is inapplicable.5 9 The requirement that notice of stockholders meetings be mailed in a sealed envelope has been deleted, probably in order to permit the use of second-class mailing
privileges.6 0 The method of determining the closing of transfer books and fixing the record date has been redrafted, although the terms are substantially as heretofore.6 1 Failure
to compile a list of stockholders prior to any meeting, as
required by Section 32,12 shall not invalidate any action taken
thereat, though the officer at fault remains liable to any
stockholder damaged thereby. 63 The criminal liability of a
director who votes for the improper declaration of any divi56

308 Ill. App. 302, 31 N.E. (2d) 364 (1941); note, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 229.

57 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 422; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.6.

58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.58.
59 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 422; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
60 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32, § 157.27,
§ 157.27.
61 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 423; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
62 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.32.
63 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 423; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,

Ch. 32, § 157.28.
with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32,
Ch. 32, § 157.29.
Ch. 32, § 157.32.
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dend or distribution is now removed if he acts in good
faith upon certain statements furnished to him by the corporate officers or agents.6 4 To clarify any doubt, the stockholder's right to have resort to mandamus proceedings to
compel an inspection of the corporate books and records is
expressly made unconditional in-so-far as duration or extent
of ownership is concerned, although the statutory right of
examination remains as heretofore. 65
Voluntary dissolution of a corporation may have been
delayed in the past by reason of the fact that the existence
of pending suits would prevent the filing of the necessary
articles. 6 By amendment to Section 80,7 the articles of
dissolution may now be executed and filed despite such fact,
provided adequate provision is made to satisfy any judgment, order, or decree which may be entered in any such
suit. Proceedings to bring about involuntary dissolution may
now be instituted on three additional grounds: (a) failure
to appoint or maintain a registered agent, (b) failure to file
statement of change of registered office or registered agent,
and (c) failure to report the issuance of authorized shares,
provided such failure continue for a period of thirty days
6 8
or more after the conduct has occurred or omission made.
Such proceedings may be abated, if, after institution and
prior to decree, the defaults are remedied by compliance
with the Act.69 Section 94 of the Business Corporations Act,7"
which formerly provided for the survival of remedies against
the corporation after its dissolution, has also been amended
to permit actions by the corporation upon rights or claims
existing in its favor for a like period.7
The act, as now amended, also permits the Secretary of
State to make a slight increase in the charge for furnishing
64

Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 425; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.42(h).

65 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 426; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
66 Ili. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32, § 157.80(e).
67 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 427; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.80(e).

Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 428; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.82.
Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 428; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.83.
70 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.94.
71 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 429; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.94. Had such a
provision been in existence at the time, the decision in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
4136 Wilcox Building Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 58 S. Ct. 125, 82 L. Ed. 147 (1937) might
have been different.
68

69
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certified copies.7 2 One other slight change may be noticed:
a drug store or pharmacy may now be operated by a corporation provided "any two statutory officers . . . are each registered pharmacists in good standing in this State. ' 7 Heretofore, all the officers were required to be registered pharmacists. 4
MASTER AND SERVANT

Labor Law
Law was made from an Illinois decision when on February 10, 1941, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the Supreme Court of Illinois in American Federation
of Labor v. Swing, s to hold that the right to picket was
constitutionally protected as an expression of free speech
which could be voiced regardless of the existence of a socalled labor dispute. The state court had held that since no
labor dispute existed within the meaning of the Illinois AntiInjunction statute, 76 the injunction could issue. 77 At the same
time, however, the same court upheld, in Milk Wagon
Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,7 s the right of
the Illinois courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes where
72 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 431; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.141(a). The increase
is from twenty-five to thirty-five cents per page.
73 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 861; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 91, § 36.
74 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 91, § 36.
75 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 513 (1941). Justices Black and Douglas
concurred in the result and Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Hughes dissented
on procedural grounds. Notes, 19 CHiCAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 290; 54 Harv. L. Rev.
1056; 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 825.
76 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 2a.
77 Swing v. American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill.91, 22 N.E. (2d) 857 (1939);
notes, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 18; 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REV w 290; 28 Ill.
B.J. 145; 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 32. The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act provides that no
injunction shall be issued "in any case involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment" restraining any person or persons
"from peaceably and without threats or intimidation being upon any public street,
or thoroughfare or highway for the purpose of . . . communicating information
.... " The interpretation placed on the statute by the Illinois Supreme Court was,
of course, binding in the Supreme Court of the United States, and its decision was
rendered without reference to the statute. The effect of the decision is to render
useless such statutes as that of Illinois. Statutes patterned after the NorrisLa Guardia Act (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115) go further.
78 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed., 497 (1941). Justice Black dissented with
Justice Douglas concurring in his dissent. Justice Reed separately dissented on
broader grounds. Notes, 19 CHICACO-KENT LAW REviEw 290; 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 779;
30 Ill.
B.J. 63; 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1064; 41 Col. L. Rev. 727.
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there is violence or a continuing threat thereof, even to the
extent, if prior acts justified it, of enjoining all picketing.
Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union" and Lawrence
Avenue Building Corporation v. Van Heck" called for an
application of these rules. In the former case, where numerous store owners sought to enjoin the Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union frQm picketing plaintiffs' stores simply because plaintiffs bought their milk from vendors and drivers who belonged to another union, the Supreme Court sustained that
part of the order of the trial court which enjoined "such conversation or action as would amount to threats, or attempts to
intimidate," but excluded "from its scope such peaceful
picketing as the evidence and the findings of the master
indicate the pickets were . . . by instruction of the appellant
union, to carry on." In the latter case, where the plaintiff,
an owner and operator of an apartment building, sought to
enjoin picketing of its building by a janitors' union which
was attempting to force an employee of plaintiff8 into the
union, the Supreme Court dissolved the restraining order
issued by the lower court pursuant to the direction of the
Appellate Court,8 2 since it found insufficient violence or
threats thereof to justify the order.8 3 The uselessness of
the Anti-Injunction Act is made apparent by these decisions.
The 1939 Prevailing Wage Act 4 requiring that not less
than the per diem prevailing wage paid for work of a similar
character in the locality in which the work is to be performed
shall be paid to laborers on all contracts for the construction
of public works when entered into by the State or a political
subdivision thereof, was held unconstitutional by the Su79 377 Ill. 76, 35 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941), Justice Farthing specially concurring.
80 377 Ill. 37, 35 N.E. (2d) 373 (1941), Justice Farthing specially concurring.
81 The employee whom the defendant was trying to force into the union was not
in fact the janitor for the building. His wife had been hired for that purpose. The
court said: "Appellee's evidence is that the wife . . . was employed to do all the
janitor work while the husband sought other work outside, though he did odd jobs
around the building such as painting, repairing and cleaning."
82 Lawrence Avenue Bldg. Corp. v. Van Heck, 305 Ill. App. 486, 27 N.E. (2d) 478
(1940). The case had been heard by the Appellate Court at its October, 1938, term.
The decision, reversing the trial court, was rendered May 20, 1940.
83 The court said: "We are of the opinion from the findings of the master and the
evidence supporting it, that this is not a case which shows threats or violence,
either to indicate a secondary boycott or to justify restraining peaceful picketing
under the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States hereinbefore
referred to."
84 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, §H 39n to 39s.
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preme Court in Reid v. Smith. 5 The act contemplated that
the "public body . . . shall ascertain the general prevailing
6
rate of per diem wages in the locality,"" and defined the
prevailing wage as "The rate determined upon as such rate
by the public body awarding the contract."" It further provided penalties for the failure of a contractor to abide by the
prevailing rate, with power in the public body to hear complaints of violations of the act, from which appeals would lie
to the courts. 8 The court concluded that the administrative
standards set up were too indefinite; that judicial powers
were delegated to the public bodies; and that the law had
"the effect of materially increasing costs, or limiting those
who might be employed in the construction of public
works." 8 9
In Mayhew v. Nelson,90 the 1931 Prevailing Wage Act 9 '
had been held invalid on the ground that the act required prevailing wages based upon the skill of individual laborers and
that no standard of skill had been set up in the act. This at
least left room for an amendment. However, the third ground
of the decision in the Reid case would seem to sound
the death knell of all such legislation. None the less, an attempt was made by the legislature in its 1941 session to avoid
the effects of the decision by the enactment of a new Prevailing Wage Act,92 which was directed to at least two of the
court's objections in the Reid case.9 3
85 375 Ill. 147, 30 N.E. (2d) 908 (1940), Justices Farthing and Murphy dissenting;
notes, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 497; 29 Il. B. J. 308; 36 Ill. L. Rev. 233; 89 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 1095.
87 111. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 39q.
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 390.
88 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 39o.
89 It was admitted by the pleadings that in the instant case the minimum wage
specified was from 30 to 75 cents per hour above that for which laborers could
reasonably have been hired.
91 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 48, §§ 39a-39f.
90 346 Ill. 381, 178 N.E. 921 (1931).
92 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, §§ 39s-1 to 39s-12.
93 In the first place, the legislature defined prevailing wages as "the wages paid
generally, in the locality in which the work is being performed, to employees engaged
in work of a similar character," Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 39s-2 (see discussion
supra) and set up administrative machinery for collecting data thereon, Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 39s-9. In the second place, it removed all penalties save the
criminal one (which was in the prior Act as well-rn. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48,
§ 39s-6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 39r), and gave any laborer who was paid less
than the prevailing wage a right of action for the amount of his shortage, characterizing such action as a suit for wages and stating that "any and all judgments
entered therein shall have the same force and effect as other judgments for
wages." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 39s-11.
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In other cases,9 4 the constitutionality of the Firemen's
and Policemen's Minimum Wage Acts of 1937 were upheld.
The 1939 amendment of the Firemen's Act, providing for an
additional tax and the adoption of the act by a referendum
was, however, declared unconstitutional.9 5 The same
amendment to the Policemen's Act was not drawn in question in the Littell case,9 6 but that amendment, together with
the amendment to the Firemen's Act was repealed by Senate
Bill 10 in the 1941 General Assembly7 in its general amendment to the Cities and Villages Act.1
The Appellate Court held in People v. Maggi 5 that beauty
shop operators were engaged in "trade and industry" within
the meaning of the Illinois Minimum Fair Wage Standards
Act for women and minors,9 9 against the contention
that since the adoption of the beauty culture license act' 0
the educational requirements for beauty culturists made
their occupation a profession.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

The legislature amended sections 7101 and 8102 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and sections 7103 and 8104 of
the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act to provide that
where death occurs to an employee as the result of an injury
or an occupational disease sustained after July 1, 1941, the
aggregate compensation payable to the injured employee shall be increased 10 per cent. Section 19105 of the Workmen's Compensation Act was amended to provide that judgments and orders of a City or Circuit Court under the Act may
be reviewed only by the Supreme Court on a writ of error
which the court may order to issue if applied for within 60
94 People v. City of Peoria, 374 Il. 313, 29 N.E. (2d) 539 (1940); Littell v. City
of Peoria, 374 Ill. 344, 29 N.E. (2d) 533 (1940).
95 374 Ill. 313, 29 N.E. (2d) 539 (1940).
96 374 Ill. 344, 29 N.E. (2d) 533 (1940).
97 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 860a, b, b-1, b-2, c, d, e, and f. See Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1941, Ch. 24, §§ lln-1, lln-2, 12n-1 and 12n-2.
98 310 Ill. App. 101, 33 N.E. (2d) 925 (1941).
99 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, §§ 198 et seq.
100 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 163/, § 15 et seq.
101 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 709, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 144.
102 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 709, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 145.
103 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 721, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 172.7.
104 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 721, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 172.8.
105 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 652, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 156.
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instead of 30 days after the rendition of said judgment or
order.
Several Supreme Court decisions during the year involved the question of whether or not the accident occurred
"in the course of employment." Two murders, 10 6 an accidental shooting resulting in death,0 7 and two deaths resulting from causes only to be inferred,0 8 were reviewed, but
all decisions turned ultimately upon the facts, and involved
no new questions of law.
A novel question of law was decided in Michelson v.
Industrial Commission. °9 Has the Industrial Commission
jurisdiction to set aside its former order approving a lump
sum settlement on the ground of fraud? The Supreme Court
of Illinois answered in the negative, stressing the fact that
the commission is an administrative body, with prescribed
and limited jurisdiction. The court referred to section 19
(h), which provides for continuing jurisdiction where on petition of either the employer or the employee it is shown that
the disability has recurred, increased, or diminished, and
concluded that such jurisdiction cannot be enlarged for purposes not specifically stated by the act.
It is well understood that proceedings under the act are
statutory, but on several occasions the nature of the writ of
certiorari, by which decisions of the Industrial Commission
are reviewed the Circuit Court has required explanation by
the Supreme Court. In Elles v. Industrial Commission,110 it
was reiterated that section 19 regulates the procedure, and
that the statutory writ is not that of common law certiorari.
An additional and novel interpretation resulted when the
court held further that jurisdiction is conferred on the Circuit Court if the return day designated in the writ complies
with the aforesaid section, and that it need not coincide with
the return day designated under the Civil Practice Act; and
further that the failure of the clerk of the court to re-docket
106 Connor Co. v. Industrial Commission, 374 Ill. 105, 28 N.E. (2d) 270 (1940);
Rosenfield v. Industrial Commission, 374 Ill. 176, 29 N.E. (2d) 102 (1940).
107 Scott v. Industrial Commission, 374 Ill. 225, 29 N.E. (2d) 93 (1940).
108 Mt. Olive & Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 374 Ill. 461, 30 N.E.
(2d) 32 (1940); General Concrete Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 375 Ill. 483,
31 N.E. (2d) 963 (1941).
109 375 Ill. 462, 31 N.E. (2d) 940 (1941).
110 375 Ill.
107, 30 N.E. (2d) 615 (1940).
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a second and independent writ, and give a new number to
the case, did not affect the Circuit Court's jurisdiction where
the claimant filed a praecipe for the new writ within the
time required under section 19, even though no clerk's fee
was paid in advance by the claimant.
In Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Service,"' a contract of employment was entered into in Michigan, and both the employer and employee agreed to be bound by the Michigan
Workmen's Act. The employee was killed while at work under the contract in Illinois, and the Supreme Court held the
Illinois Act inapplicable, citing Cole v. Industrial Commission.112 Miller v. Yellow Cab Company,"' might be termed
a companion to the Blue Bird Air Service case, with some of
the facts reversed. In the Miller case, the plaintiff resided in
Texas and was an employee of Sears Roebuck & Co., a New
York corporation, doing business in Texas and in Illinois and
subject to the Compensation Acts of the several states in
which it did business. Miller's contract of employment was
made and was to be performed principally in Texas. While
he was temporarily in Illinois and while riding as a passenger
in Chicago in a Yellow Cab, he was injured. He brought a
common law action against the Yellow Cab Company for
negligence. The defendant contended that the plaintiff, his
employer, and the defendant were all operating under the
Illinois Compensation Act and that, therefore, the plaintiff
could not maintain a common law action inasmuch as his
employer is automatically subrogated to such action and the
recovery limited to the amount of compensation payable under the act." 4 The defendant contended further that even
under the Texas law, which plaintiff contended was controlling, the plaintiff must choose between compensation and his
common law right against the wrongdoer, and that the plaintiff had already elected by receiving compensation.
The court, through Mr. Justice Burke, held the action to be
maintainable and not opposed to public policy. The Texas act
111 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E. (2d) 14 (1940).

112 353 Ill. 415, 187 N.E. 520, 90 A.L.R. 116 (1933). The real controversy involving
a constitutional question as to whether or not the Michigan statute was entitled
to full faith and credit will be found discussed under Conflict of Laws.
113 308 Ill. App. 217, 31 N.E. (2d) 406 (1941); notes, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw
397; 30 I1. B.J. 110.
114 fll. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 166.
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applied under the terms of the contract of employment, and
under Texas law, the employee could recover against a third
party, whether or not the third party and its employees were
under the act. The election argument was met by calling
attention to the fact that originally the insurer of the Texas
employee had joined as party plaintiff, and had then been
given leave to withdraw with the consent of the defendant
and the co-plaintiff Miller. This explanation was rather lightly sketched, and might have caused the plaintiff some difficulty upon further appellate review.
FAMILY

The procedure for securing a license to marry has been
altered by requiring that both applicants appear in person
and furnish the necessary affidavits as to their respective
ages and the legality of the contemplated marriage."' The
provision enacted in 1937 requiring a three-day delay between
application and issuance of license,"' has been abolished,
it probably being deemed unnecessary by reason of the provisions requiring physical examination for venereal disease.
The medical certificate, however, must now be signed by the
applicant in the presence of the examining physician, under
penalty, to prevent the possibility of substitution."'
An attempt to revive the "family purpose" doctrine, so
as to establish liability upon the car owner for the negligent
conduct of his wife while driving the same, has been made
through the guise of the Family Expense Act"8 in the decision in O'Haran v. Leiner." Despite the earlier rejection
of the doctrine by the Illinois Supreme Court,' the Appellate Court, Fourth District, under an unusual set of facts
there found that defendant's wife, without express permission, while driving her husband's car to purchase a Halloween party dress for their daughter, was the "agent" of the
husband-owner in making such purchase, inasmuch as under
115 Laws 1941, p. 857; 1H. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 89, § 6.
116 Laws 1937, p. 908; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 6.
117 Laws 1941, p. 859; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 89, § 6a.
118 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 68, § 15.
119 306 Ill. App. 230, 28 N.E. (2d) 315 (1940); notes, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REV W
202; 39 Mich. L. Rev. 309; 29 Ill. B.J. 305.
120 Andersen v. Byrnes, 344 Ill. 240, 176 N.E. 374 (1931).
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such statute he might have been obliged to pay for the same,
so that her tort was chargeable to him as principal.
The extent of the dower right of a divorced spouse in the
estate of the deceased former spouse 2 ' is to be measured
by the terms of the statute providing for dower as it stands
at the time the divorce is granted according to Opdahl v.
Johnson.122 Subsequent changes in such statute, even though
made while the right of dower remains inchoate because the
former spouses continue alive, will not, therefore, increase
the dower portion due the successful divorced spouse.
While, upon adoption, the adopted child becomes an heir
of the adopting parent, 1 23 even though the latter died testate
124
leaving a will executed prior to the adoption proceedings,
nevertheless, such adopted child may not, under the decision
in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Hardeen,125 participate as a legatee in a subsequently drawn
will providing for the distribution of income to "my then
surviving lawful issue," since the latter term must, at law,
be confined to the children born to the testator in lawful
wedlock. Upon adoption, the natural parents of the adopted
child not only lose the right of custody, 126 but also, as an
incident, lose even the right of visitation under People ex rel.
Witton v. Harriss.12 7 The fact that the natural parent may
be called upon to support the adopted infant if necessity
arises 2 is not enough to overcome the clear provision that.
upon adoption, "the child shall, to all legal intents and purposes, be the child of the petitioner.... 129
121 Dower right is retained only by the successful spouse in the divorce proceedings, and forfeited by the guilty spouse. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 173.
122 306 Ill.App. 145, 28 N.E. (2d) 308 (1940). The divorced wife secured her
decree in 1896, at which time the dower right was confined to lands of which the
deceased spouse was seized during the marriage. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, Ch. 41, § 1.
The amendment of 1927, effective at the death of the divorced husband, conferred
dower right in personal property as well. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 41, § 1. Following
Kent v. McCann, 52 Ill.
App. 305 (1893), it was held that, upon divorce, the relationship of the parties ceased except in so far as preserved by the then existing
Dower Act.
123 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 165.
124 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 199. Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Il. 396, 65 N.E.
782 (1902).
125 306 Ill.
App. 123, 28 N.E. (2d) 124 (1940).
126 111. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 4, § 8.
127 307 Ill.
App. 283, 30 N.E. (2d) 169 (1940).
128 Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N.E. (2d) 344 (1937); notes, 16 CHIcAO-KENT
LAW REVmw 199; 17 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 41.
129 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 4, § 3.

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1940-1941

The right of an infant to repudiate a contract made during minority, even though induced by his fraudulent misrepresentations as to his age, while not denied in Berryman v. Highway Trailer Company,13 0 is now, by reason of
the counterclaim provisions of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act, 131 subject to the right of the adult to recoup the damage
he has suffered by reason of such fraud should he wish to
present a counterclaim therefor. One further fact may be
mentioned concerning minors. While a female minor attains
her majority in Illinois on reaching the age of eighteen," 2
she has been disqualified from exercising certain privileges
until she has reached the age of twenty-one. 13 She may
now, by reason of a change in the Notaries Public Act,' M
qualify as a notary public upon attaining her legal majority.
PROPERTY
TRUSTS

Legislative action this year overshadows in importance
the work of the courts in the development of trust law. The
adoption of a modified form of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act 13' marks the first important statutory addition
in Illinois to the law of trusts in many years. In a state
where there has been remarkably little statutory trust law
the enactment of this act may forecast increased legislative regulation.
The purpose of the act is to provide rules for the guidance
of trustees in handling the difficult problems of apportionment and allocation of receipts and disbursements between
income and principal, as well as to provide rules for apportionment between life tenant and remainderman in non130 307 Ill. App. 480, 30 N.E.
(2d) 761
REviEw 302.
131 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 162.
132

(1940); note, 19
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Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 283.

133 See, for example, the right to vote, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 46, § 338; right to
serve as a juror, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 78, § 2.
134 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 933; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 99, § 1.
135 An Act concerning the ascertainment of principal and income and the apportionment of receipts and expenses in trusts and among tenants and remaindermen.
Laws 1941, Vol. 1, pp. 407 et seq.; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, §§ 159-176. For a full
treatment of the act by the draftsman, Professor George G. Bogert, see 9 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 30.
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trust estates. The act has been adopted in substance in ten
states.136
The rules set forth are designed to govern only in the
absence of controlling provisions in the trust instrument or
other document creating the estate. Thus a settlor may himself specify the duties of the trustee or may leave the entire
matter to the trustee's discretion.1 37 In view of this fact
the established practices of corporate trustees in regard to
apportionment need not be disturbed. The act is applicable
only to inter-vivos trusts created on or after its effective
date and to testamentary trusts only where the testator .died
138
on or after such date.
Section 3 of the act is a detailed statement of the items
to be considered income and of those to be considered principal. A uniform rule of apportionment between successive
beneficiaries entitled to income is provided for those cases
where some portion of such income is derived from periodic
payments. Hence a beneficiary who ceased to be entitled to
income at a time between two periodic payments will be
entitled to his proportionate share of the second payment
regardless of whether the payment is rent, interest, or of
other character. 139 In the case of inter-vivos trusts, income
earned or accrued but not paid at the date of creation is to
be treated as income; while in the case of testamentary
trusts income earned or accrued but not paid at the date of
the testator's death is to be added to principal. 14 0 Unless
otherwise provided, the income beneficiary in a testamentary trust is entitled to income from the date of the testator's
death. 4 '
Section 7 establishes the principle of amortization in
the case of bonds or obligations purchased at a premium but
provides that there shall be no amortization in the case of
bonds or obligations purchased at a discount, and the entire
proceeds upon collection shall be credited to principal.4 2
136 A labama, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina,
Oregon, Utah, Virginia, 9 U.L.A., Principal and Income, 1941 Supp., p. 278.
137 § 2, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 160.
188 § 16, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 174.
139 § 4 (1), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 162(1).
140 § 4 (2), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 162(2).
141 § 4 (3), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 162(3).
142 § 7 (4), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 165(4).
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Of particular interest is the section dealing with the
problem of the sale of unproductive property. 4 3 An apportionment is directed only where the trustee is expressly
directed to sell such property and there is a delayed sale. In
cases where there is no express direction to sell, the rule
in Illinois against apportionment would appear to remain as
laid down in Love v. Engelke.' Other provisions of the act
deal with the problems of wasting assets'4 5 and the allocation and apportionment of expenses. 4 6 The act provides
uniform and well-considered rules for the guidance of trustees and others in the handling of questions which are often
neglected in the drafting of trust instruments.
The case law dealing with trusts during the past year is
mainly cumulative. One interesting case involving the creation of inter-vivos trusts deserves notice. The late Arthur
W. Cutten, well-known Chicago financier, carried a brokerage account in the name of his brother-in-law, Boomer. In
1924 he seems to have decided to give certain securities
which were in the account to Boomer on condition that
Boomer would execute a trust instrument reserving the life
income to himself and providing for ultimate distribution
to the Home for Destitute Crippled Children. Boomer executed such a trust instrument naming Cutten and two others
as trustees. The securities were not then withdrawn from
the brokerage account. Ten years later, upon the closing
of the Chicago office of the brokerage firm, the certificates
were delivered to Boomer and were later placed in a safety
deposit box to which both Cutten and Boomer had access. In
litigation involving the disappearance of the certificates from
the box it was contended that no trust had ever arisen, inasmuch as there had been no delivery of the certificates to
the trustees. The Appellate Court held that "a present unequivocal assignment of shares of stock in a corporation with
intention to pass the title will accomplish the transfer of
the title to the shares to the assignee as between the parties
without delivery of any stock certificates. 4 7
143 § 12, Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 170.
144 368 Ill.
342, 14 N.E. (2d) 228 (1938); notes, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 44;
6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 29.
145 §§ 10 and 11.
146 §§ 14 and 15.
147 Home for Destitute Crippled Children v. Boomer, 308 Ill. App. 170, 31 N.E.
(2d) 812 (1941).
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A, problem of purchase money resulting trusts was before the Supreme Court in the case of Frasier v. Finlay.'4 8
According to the complaint a mortgage on real estate belonging to the plaintiff was being foreclosed. Defendant suggested that plaintiff execute a judgment note to defendant
who would cause a judgment to be entered which would
entitle defendant to redeem from the foreclosure sale. Defendant agreed to advance $5,000 if plaintiff would provide
the balance necessary to effect a redemption. A redemption
was accordingly accomplished and defendant became the
title holder, but refused to recognize any interest of the
plaintiff. The court held the transaction to be in the nature
of a loan of a portion of the purchase price by the defendant
to the plaintiff, and decided that if the allegations of the complaint were proved the plaintiff would be entitled to a
decree establishing a resulting trust of the whole property
subject to the defendant's right to hold the title as security
for the repayment of the amount advanced. The case is of
interest because the court overruled the contention that the
plaintiff was not in equity with clean hands because the note
had been given for the express purpose of putting the defendant in position to redeem. In view of the facts this ruling is
clearly correct.
Confidential relationships as the basis of constructive
trusts were discussed by the Supreme Court in two cases. 14 9
In the Steinmetz case the court divided constructive trusts
into two general classes: one, where actual fraud forms the
basis, and the other where there is a confidential relationship. A confidential relationship was said to exist "where
trust and confidence are reposed by one person in another
who, as a result, gains an influence and superiority over the
other."
The Appellate Court passed upon three cases involving
questions of administration which are of passing importance.
A trustee who distributed trust funds to himself in good faith,
but in the mistaken belief that he was a beneficiary, was
held not entitled to the protection of an exculpatory clause
148 375 Ill. 78, 30 N.E. (2d) 613 (1940).
149 Gilbert v. Cohn, 374 Ill. 452, 30 N.E. (2d) 19 (1940); Steinmetz v. Kern, 375
Ill. 616, 32 N.E. (2d) 151 (1941).
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to avoid restoring such funds. 5 ° In another case the court
held that a trustee might properly employ a real estate broker to sell property which the trustee was authorized to dispose of, and that a successor trustee might be sued in an effort to compel the payment of commission out of the trust
estate, although the successor trustee was not personally liable. 151 The opinion does not discuss the question of whether
the suit was considered to have been brought at law or in
1 52
equity. In the case of Rothbart v. Metropolitan Trust Co.
it was held that attorneys who rendered services to the trust
could recover fees out of the trust estate in equity rather than
be compelled to proceed against the trustees personally at
law. In this case the trust instrument provided against the
personal liability of the trustees, and the court spelled out
an intention to charge the trust estate. The case involved two
liquidation trusts. An instructive discussion of the cy pres
doctrine in charitable trusts is to be found in the per curiam
opinion of the Supreme Court in Village of Hinsdale v. Chi153
cago City Missionary Society.
A rather unusual problem, involving the duties of trustees under deeds-of trust after foreclosure, was before the
Supreme Court in the case of Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Rogers Park Apartments Building Corporation."'
In this case property was sold at foreclosure sale to a committee representing the holders of a large percentage of the
bonds and was paid for by cancellation of bonds held by the
purchaser and an additional sum in cash. The court entered
a decree providing for the payment of the cash to the trustee
to be disbursed to the nondepositing bondholders and reserved jurisdiction to supervise the distribution. A deficiency
decree was also entered. Eight years later, the case having
been dormant for that period, the court of its own motion and
without the intervention of any interested person directed the
trustee to account and to pay over any unclaimed funds to
the clerk of the court.
The Supreme Court called this order void, indicating that
the issue was whether or not the trustee held the funds
150 Countiss v. Whiting, 307 Ill. App. 548, 29 N.E. (2d) 277 (1940).
151 Newby v. Kingman, 309 Ill. App. 36, 32 N.E. (2d) 647 (1941).
152 307 Ill. App. 271, 30 N.E. (2d) 183 (1940).
153 375 IMl. 220, 30 N.E. (2d) 657 (1940).
154 375 IlI. 599, 32 N.E. (2d) 137 (1941).
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as trustee or merely as a depositary for the convenience of
the court. In view of the terms of the trust deed, the decree,
and the purpose for which the money was paid over, it seems
clear that the trustee continued in its trust capacity as long
as any of the res remained in its hands and any of its duties
were unperformed. The trial court seems to have been motivated by a desire to effect some solution of the problem
created where unclaimed funds remain in the hands of trustees indefinitely. In view of the fact that the doctrine of escheat is inapplicable, and of expressions to the effect that the
doctrine of bona vacantia is not law in Illinois, 155 legislation
seems to be the only answer. 156
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

Probably the most significant case in the field of probate
law in the period of this survey is that rendered in Furst v.
Brady,'15 7 in which the Supreme Court overruled the decision
of the Appellate Court and held that the county or probate
court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator for a nonresident decedent whose only asset in Illinois is an unsealed
contract of public liability insurance with a company licensed to do business in Illinois. The result of the decision is
to allow an injured person or the personal representative of
a deceased person to maintain in this state a suit for personal
injuries or wrongful death which occurred in Illinois although
the guilty person was a nonresident who died before suit.
A claim filed against the estate of a decedent on the last
day for filing may be allowed by the probate court although
a copy thereof was not mailed to the attorney for the estate
at the time of filing, as required by Rule 11 of the Probate
Court of Cook County, but was mailed a few days later. This
decision of the Appellate Court in In re Estate of Kurlandsky 5 ' Seems obviously correct, but in view of the fact that
this is a question that frequently occurs in practice, it appears worth noting.
155 Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F. (2d) 58 (1939), cert. den. 307 U.S.
648 (1939).
156 The problem is discussed fully in 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 802.
157 375 Ill. 425, 31 N.E. (2d) 606 (1940); notes, 19 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 293;
54 Harv. L. Rev. 1401; 29 Ill. B. J. 404; 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 769.
158 308 Ill. App. 297, 31 N.E. (2d) 318 (1941).
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At the last session of the Legislature, Section 46 of the
Probate Act was amended to conform to the prior law. The
1939 law read, "Marriage by the testator shall revoke any
existing will . . . . " The former act had read, "Marriage ...
" The word "deemed" was
shall be deemed to revoke ....
5 9 where the court decided
relied on in Ford v. Greenawalt,'
that marriage did not revoke a will which stated that it was
made for the benefit of, and in contemplation of the testator's
marriage to, the principal beneficiary. The same reason was
given for the same result in the case of Kuhn v. Bartels,16 0
which was decided in 1940 under the old act. But the court in
the latter case distinguished the language of the old act from
that of the statutes of other jurisdictions where the
word "deemed" is not present. Under such statutes the will
has been held to have been revoked by the testator's marriage regardless of the testator's apparent intent. It is likely,
therefore, that, but for the recent amendment which reinserts the word "deemed" in the statute, the Illinois courts
would have been obliged to hold a will to be revoked by the
testator's marriage although the will expressly stated that
it was made for the benefit of the testator's intended spouse.
Koelmel v. Kaelin 61 may be added to a long list of cases
which undertake to determine whether devised land is sufficiently described, after words of false description are deleted, to admit extrinsic evidence of identification. In that
case the court found the remaining description adequate,
although in previous cases of like facts the court had excluded
extrinsic evidence on the ground that it alone would identify
the land. Although the court did not say that it considered the
decision in the early leading case of Kurtz v. Hibner6 2 to be
incorrect, the conclusion seems inescapable that the court
here did not approve that decision.
The 1941 Session of the Illinois Legislature also amended the Probate Act' 1 by adding an article designated as
II A." 4 This article eliminates the confusion formerly present in situations involving "simultaneous deaths." The
amendment applies to the simultaneous deaths of benefici126 N.E. 555 (1920).
160 374 Ill. 231, 29 N.E. (2d) 84 (1940).
161 374 Ill. 204, 29 N.E. (2d) 106 (1940); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 222.
162 55 Ill. 514 (1870).
163 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, §§ 151 et seq.
164 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 6; I1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, §§ 192.1-192.7.
159 292 Ill. 121,
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aries, 1 joint tenants, 166 and of the insured and beneficiary
in life or accident insurance policies. 167 Provision is made for
the testator or settlor who wishes to set up his own rules. 6
The new article does not apply to distribution of the estate
of a person who dies prior to its effective date. 16 9
Two cases dealing with construction of wills and trusts
may be mentioned as of some interest. In the case of Hormann v. Northern Trust Company,'17 the instrument provided that "in case of the death of said John Tanner," his
share was to go to the testatrix' daughter. The testatrix died
some thirty-three years before the said John Tanner, and
it was held that upon his death his share went not to the
daughter or her heirs, but to the heirs of John Tanner. The
court applied the usual rule of construction that where property is devised to one person and "in case of his death" to
another, the testator will be presumed to have had in mind
the death of the daughter before his own and not at some
future time after his own. While there was perhaps sufficient
evidence of actual intent in the will to indicate that this was
the testatrix' intention and therefore there would be no reason to apply the presumption, still the conclusion reached was
proper under the circumstances.
In the other case, Countiss v. Whiting,171 a trust instrument provided that in case of the death of certain beneficiaries, the income from a certain portion of the trust was to
be paid to the "lawful heirs" of such deceased daughter. Upon the death of the daughter, the daughter's husband claimed
to be entitled to the income therefrom as heir. The court held
that he did not come under the description of "heir," which
was taken in its technical sense, that is to say, the person
who would take by law the intestate realty of the decedent.
At the time the facts in issue arose, a husband or wife would
not by statute have been entitled to share in the intestate
realty without first having renounced dower. That fact alone
presumably stood in the way of considering the surviving
Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3,
Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3,
167 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3,
168 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3,
169 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch, 3,
170 114 F. (2d) 118 (1940); note, 29 Ill. B. J. 228.
171 306 Ill. App. 548, 29 N.E. (2d) 277 (1940); note, 35
165

166

§ 192.2.
§ 192.3.
§ 192.4.
§ 192.6.
§ 192.5.
II. L. Rev. 981.
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spouse as an heir. Should the situation arise since the adoption of the Illinois Probate Act,172 effective in 1940, the result
would presumably be otherwise, since by that act the surthe realty absolutely unless
viving spouse inherits a share in
173
dower.
to
right
his
perfects
he
The Illinois Supreme Court carried the presumption of
due execution of a will arising from the genuineness of the
signatures and appearance of proper execution to the full
extent in Brelie v. Wilkie. 174 In that case the two witnesses
testified, one that the testatrix' signature was not on the will
when she signed as witness, and the other that he could not
see whether it was signed or not because the will was so
folded as to conceal the place for the testatrix' signature.
Because of the court's belief that the witnesses were falsifying for the purpose of defeating the will, the will was admitted despite their testimony and with the aid of no other evidence save that of the physical appearance of the will.
In Groesbeck v. Beaupre,75 the Appellate Court allowed
a contingent claim, which could not be filed prior to the
expiration of the nonclaim statutory period, against the executor to the extent of uninventoried assets and against the
distributee of personal property to the extent of assets received. The result is a sensible one, but serves to raise a
question as to why the new Probate Act failed to make specific provision for the means of satisfying contingent claims.
An interesting question of jurisdiction was raised in London and Lancashire Indemnity Company v. Tindall.171 The
circuit court had taken jurisdiction of a suit to establish a
right of subrogation to a distributee's share claimed by the
surety of a defaulting executor who was also a distributee.
The fund was also being claimed by the divorced wife of the
distributee who held a conditional garnishment judgment for
unpaid alimony against the administrator who succeeded the
defaulting executor. Objection was made that the probate
court had jurisdiction, but the Circuit Court of Jackson County held that it had the right to determine the matter and
172
173
174
175
176

Il1.
See
373
307
307

Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, §§ 151 et seq.
Illinois Probate Act Anotated, Foundation Press, Inc., (1940), p. 14.
Ill. 409, 26 N.E. (2d) 475 (1940); note, 29 Ill. B. J. 314.
Il. App. 215, 30 N.E. (2d) 531 (1940); note, 29 Ill. B. J. 475.
Ill. App. 45, 29 N.E. (2d) 941 (1940).
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thereupon took jurisdiction and decided the case on its merits. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial
court, giving the reason that the probate court had jurisdiction exclusive of the chancery court. The dissenting judge
pointed out that, while the court of equity will usually refuse
to exercise or assume jurisdiction in ordinary cases of administration, it may in the exercise of its discretion assume
jurisdiction in special instances, and that in all of the prior
Illinois cases where the issue had been raised, the equity
court had refused to take jurisdiction, and it had been held
on appeal to be a proper course because the probate court
was competent to render a decision; but that once the equity
court has in its discretion taken jurisdiction it is not proper
to reverse the judgment after a decision on the merits merely because of the fact that the probate court might perhaps
have been in a position to decide the matter under the exercise of its equity powers. It may be noted at this point that
the Appellate Court decision has recently been reversed in
the Supreme Court 177 for reasons stated in the dissenting
opinion of the Appellate Court.
Cox v. Rice 78 raised the question of whether or not a conservator who was unable to comply with the court's order
to pay over all moneys which had come into his hands, as conservator, could be imprisioned for contempt of court. 179 The
conservator, Cox, contended that the statute did not apply to
him because he did not have actual possession of the trust
fund belonging to his ward at the time the rule to show cause
was filed-and that it was therefore not in his "custody or control."'' 0 The court reiterated its holding in Tudor v. Firebaugh,'8 ' stating that the statute did not apply where a conservator has never had actual possession or control over the
assets of his ward or of the res of a trust, but that since Cox
had wrongfully disposed of the ward's money by investing
it without obtaining the court's approval, "it remained, in
177 London and Lancashire Indemnity Company v. Tindall, 377 Ill. 308, 36 N.E.
(2d) 334 (1941).
178 375 Ill. 357, 32 N.E. (2d) 137 (1941); 30 Ill. B. J. 112.
179 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 86, §§ 9 and 35.
180 The money had been invested in one of several notes secured by a mortgage
since foreclosed and a time deposit certificate in the Dime Savings Bank, but
these investments had never been approved by the county court.
181 364 Ill.
283, 4 N.E. (2d) 393 (1936).
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contemplation of law, in his custody and control, and his in-

ability to pay is no defense to the contempt proceeding."
MORTGAGES

For years every instrument purporting to transfer land
titles, including real estate mortgages and trust deeds, had to
be sealed in order to be effectual." 2 The requirement of
sealing still continues, but, if apt language appears in the
instrument, or the acknowledgment thereof, to the effect that
the same was sealed, a presumption arises now that such
was the case, and any omission of a seal in a certified copy
of such instrument is deemed to have arisen by the failure
of the recorder in making the transcription thereof. 8' Further, recitation in the instrument or the acknowledgement thereof that the same was sealed shall constitute the
adoption by the grantor of any seal appearing thereon, including the seal of the notary public.' Mortages heretofore
irregularly executed in this particular are now validated. 8 5
While the purchaser of mortgaged premises does not become personally bound to pay the mortgage thereon unless
the language in the deed or contract clearly imports such assumption,8 6 still a subsequent assumption of such liability,
as at the time an extension thereof is granted, is enough to
make such purchaser liable for any deficiency arising under
foreclosure proceedings. A common form of extension agreement in use in Cook County, after providing for the extension
of the maturity date of the principal, makes such extension
conditional "so long as the said party of the second
part [owner of the equity of redemption] shall promptly pay
interest thereon . . . and shall further keep and perform all

and singular the covenants and agreements in said note . . .
87
and trust deed contained." It was held in Albers v. Moe,1
182 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 1. This statute was originally enacted in 1827;
Rev. Laws 1827, 95. For the effect to be given to an unsealed deed see Barger v.
Hobbs, 67 Ill. 592 (1873); Wilson v. Kruse, 270 Ill. 298, 110 N.E. 359 (1915).
183 Laws, 1941, 416; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 34.
184 Laws, 1941, 417: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 34a.
185 Laws, 1941, 417: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 35b following § 34. Albert E.
Jenner, Jr., explains the necessity for the amendment by saying: "It seems that
the word 'seal' was omitted from a series of printed form deeds circulated in the
Peoria area." 30 Ill. B. J. 21.
186 Siegel v. Borland, 191 Ill. 107, 60 N.E. 863 (1901).
187 306 Ill. App. 208, 28 N.E. (2d) 178 (1940).
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that the execution of such an extension agreement bound the
owner of the equity of redemption to pay both interest and
principal, and hence that a personal deficiency decree
against him was proper, despite his contention that his only
promise was to pay the interest accruing, as evidenced by
his personally executed extension interest coupons.
The mortgagee bringing foreclosure proceedings is
8 to
warned by Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Joseph1
include in the foreclosure decree all sums then due,
whether for principal, interest, or taxes paid pending the
litigation, or else risk the loss thereof. In that case, the mortgagee, after instituting suit and prior to decree, paid certain
general taxes but inadvertently failed to include the amount
thereof in the decree or to reopen the same to take further
proof thereon. After unsuccessful attempts to prevent redemption unless such tax claim was discharged, the mortgagee sued in equity to secure subrogation to the tax lien of
the state, but was denied relief, even though it alleged full
knowledge on the part of the mortgagor of such facts, upon
the ground that such payment does not grant any lien or liability apart from that of the mortgage. While the statute is
explicit as to the manner of securing repayment of funds
advanced after sale to pay taxes, in the event a redemption
occurs," 9 this is the first time the instant problem has arisen
in Illinois.
The question of the right to the rents in the hands of a
receiver in foreclosure- proceedings took an unusual turn in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Schwarz, 19 0 in which case,
after proceedings had been instituted and a receiver appointed, the parties agreed upon a conveyance of the
premises in full satisfaction of the mortgage indebtedness.
No decree was ever entered. Upon the final report of the receiver, the former owners sought an order directing the delivery of the balance to them, which the mortgagee contested, contending that the right thereto was in it, either because such was the understanding of the parties at the time
of the settlement, though not included in the written agreement, or else by virtue of certain assignment provisions in
306 Ill. App. 244, 28 N.E. (2d) 330 (1940).
189 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 28.
190 310 Ill. App. 205, 33 N.E. (2d) 934 (1941).
188
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the mortgage itself. The court, finding the conveyance of
the premises was treated as full satisfaction of the mortgagor's obligation, denied the mortgagee any right to the fund,
following earlier cases in which foreclosure proceedings had

been dismissed without any decree,1 9 ' or in which a strict
foreclosure had been granted. 192 Foreclosure settlements,

such as that in the instant case, should now be drafted with
definite provisions therein for the disposition of funds in the
hands of the court.
The omission of a known junior encumbrancer, or des-

cription of him as an "unknown owner," in foreclosure proceedings based on the senior encumbrance, will not defeat
his right to secure statutory redemption, according to

Callner v. Greenberg,' even though the statutory period
of redemption has expired, and such junior encumbrancer
still has an equitable right of redemption available, if it appears that such omission or misdescription was fraudulently
motivated. Of further interest to the practitioner is the fact

that while litigation involving the validity of a certificate of
sale issued pursuant to a foreclosure decree does not ordin-

arily involve a freehold, and that, hence, direct appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court is not possible,' such may be the

case, according to Litwin v. Litwin, 9 ' where the period of
redemption has expired and a decision on the question of the
ownership of the certificate of sale is concerned, since a determination thereof, with the consequent right to obtain the
customary deed, will involve a freehold.
A judgment creditor who asserts the right to redeem from a mortgage foreclosure sale may purchase at
the ensuing redemption sale but, according to First National
Bank of Assumption v. Gordon,96 he may acquire only the
title held by his judgment debtor in the premises so sold, even
191 Corcoran v. Witz, 252 Ill. App. 473 (1929).
192 West Frankfort Building & Loan Association v. Dorris,
260 Ill. App. 21 (1930).
193 376 Ill. 212, 33 N.E. (2d) 437 (1941), reversing 304 Ill, App.
501, 26 N.E. (2d)
675 (1940); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVEw 387.
194 Kronenberger v. Heinemann, 190 Ill. 17, 60 N.E. 64
(1901).
195 375 Ill. 90, 30 N.E. (2d) 619 (1940). In that case the husband,
holder of the
certificate of sale, assigned the same to his wife, induced so
to do by her fraud.
Upon her application for an order to compel the issuance of a
deed after redemption period had expired, he filed a cross-petition seeking cancellation
of the assignment and surrender of the certificate. Held: cross-petition granted.
196 374 Ill. 242, 29 N.E. (2d) 246 (1940); note, 29 Ill. B. J. 187.
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though he thereby relieves the other title holders of the consequences of the foreclosure. In that case four tracts of land
covered by the same mortgage had been sold en masse
under foreclosure proceedings. A judgment creditor, whose
debtor owned but a single parcel, had redeemed and purchased at the subsequent redemption sale. The deed issued
thereunder purported to convey all four parcels, but was held
to have been effective only as to the single parcel owned by
19
the judgment debtor. 7
Legislative tinkering with the limitation statutes affecting mortgages has again occurred. The statute enacted
in 1935 has been repealed 9 " and replaced by a new provision
which puts a twenty-year limitation on all mortgages, to be
measured from the stated maturity date thereof (thirty
years from date if no due date stated) unless, within apt
time, an extension agreement or an affidavit be filed by the
holder thereof, in which case the lien shall extend for an additional period of ten years, with like provision for renewal
thereafter. The act is expressly made applicable to both registered and unregistered lands.'9 9
The statute regarding chattel mortgages on personal
property has also been amended to permit the duration thereof to continue for five years, instead of three years as heretofore, and, if the stated maturity date is less than five years,
permits the continuation of the lien for an additional year so
as not to exceed a total of five years, if an affidavit setting
forth the facts is recorded within ninety days of the maturity
200
date.
TITLES

Of interest to conveyancers is Herrick v. Lain,'° ' in
which a grant was made "to Edith M. Lafferty, . . . and
to her children." The court held that Edith M. Lafferty re197 Decisions in Schroeder v. Bozarth, 224 Ill. 310, 79 N.E. 583 (1906), sale of life
tenant's interest; Sledge v. Dobbs, 254 Ill. 130, 98 N.E. 243 (1912), sale of interest
of a co-tenant; and Huber v. Hess, 191 Ill. 305, 61 N.E. 61 (1901), sale of interest
of owner of a portion of the premises, were followed.
19s Laws 1935, p. 951, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 83, §11a, repealed by Laws 1941,
p. 854.
199 Laws 1941, p. 853, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § llb.
200 Laws 1941, p. 874, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 95, § 4. Compare with Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, § 4.
201 375 Ill. 569, 32 N.E. (2d) 154 (1941); note, 29 I1l. B. J. 480.
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ceived a fee since she had no children at the time of the
conveyance. The decision was based upon the well-settled
rules in Illinois that a deed takes effect at the time of delivery
and that all who take by purchase must be in esse at the
time. °2 It will be noted that the grant does not include any
words of procreation. The court said,
The requisites of such a deed are that there be persons able to contract with for the purpose intended by the deed, so that in every grant
20 3
there must be a grantee, a grantor and the thing granted.

In this case Edith M. Lafferty was the only person "able
to contract with." The last portion of the deed grants to
her, "her heirs and assigns forever." Instead of limiting
the grant, these words convey a fee to Edith M. Lafferty.
The same view was also taken in Hartwick v. Heberling. °4
A conveyance to Isabella Grimes, "her children and lawful
heirs," contained the added recital that it was the intention
of the grantor to give Isabella a life estate only. In Illinois,
where an estate is not limited expressly, by construction, or
operation of law, words of inheritance are not necessary to
grant a fee. In this deed there are no limitations on the grant
to Edith M. Lafferty.
In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. West 2= it was held that
the words "to be used for road purposes" limited the grant
to an easement for a road and that the oil rights did not
pass by such a conveyance. Under Section 13206 of our Conveyancing Act, the grant would have passed a fee except
for the fact that the words "to be used for road purposes"
were added after the description of the premises. The Supreme Court said that when words of inheritance are not
used, every word, no matter where situated in the deed, is
to be given weight in determining the estate granted and
that where the granting clause does not specify the estate
granted, Section 13 does not require that words repugnant
to a fee be disregarded, if a fee, in fact, is not clearly granted, but words of limitation may be construed as declaratory
of intention, and the deed, taken as a whole, may be con202 Miller v. McAlister, 197 Ill. 72, 64 N.E. 254 (1902); Morris v. Caudle, 178

11. 9, 52 N.E. 1036 (1899).
20 Quoting from Duffield v. Duffield, 268 IM. 29, 108 N.E. 673 (1915).
204 364 IMl. 523, 4 N.E. (2d) 965 (1936).
205 374 Il. 516, 30 N.E. (2d) 24 (1940); note, 29 II. B. J. 265.
206 IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 30, § 13.
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sidered and construed as conveying a lesser estate. 20 7 The
surrounding facts and circumstances were also used to determine the intention of the grantors.
By similar deeds, decisions in the Federal courts have
sometimes found that a fee has been conveyed,0 " and that
the words "for right of way" were descriptive of the use
and not words of limitation. In Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Thompson, °9 the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an easement was created, but this case was appealed
to the United States Supreme Court and that court declined
to pass on the point pending a decision in the Illinois courts.
The instant case may settle the point for Illinois, but it is
possible that if all surrounding circumstances are to be considered in construing such a deed, they may sometimes so
influence the result that a court might hold that a fee had
been conveyed.
In Shell Oil Company v. Manley Oil Company2 1 a court
in Illinois, seemingly for the first time, passed upon the
meaning of the words "surface only" in a deed conveying
land where the grantor had previously conveyed the coal
rights. These words were used in the habendum clause. The
court found that at the time of the deed all the coal had
been previously conveyed and was excepted from this conveyance. The Federal District Court said that it was a custom in Franklin County, Illinois, to use "surface only" in
a deed to convey all that was left of the fee after all coal
had been conveyed. The court looked to all parts of the
deed and surrounding circumstances in arriving at the
meaning of "surface only" and held that it conveyed a fee,
except for the coal rights, and did grant the oil and gas.
The word "surface" used in a deed is not rigid in meaning
and does not always mean that portion of the land used for
agricultural purposes. The word so used is ambiguous and
will be construed against the grantor, the court ruled.2 n
It would seem that the safe thing for future grantors to do
in cases like this would be to write in a specific reservation
or exception with respect to gas and oil.
207 Bear v. Millikin Trust Co., 336 Ill.
366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929).
208 112 F. (2d) 299 (1941).
209 106 F. (2d) 217 (1939).
210 37 F. Supp. 289 (1941); note, 19 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REv w 386.
211 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.), § 978, and cases cited therein.
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In Carter Oil Company v. McQuigg, 212 a grantor, back
in 1919, gave a quit claim deed to his five children, providing that "this deed is not to take effect during the lifetime of either of the grantors." (The grantor's wife joined
in the conveyance). The subsequent discovery of oil resulted
in bitter litigation. The District Court held that, under Illinois law, such a provision had the effect of granting a remainder in fee to the children and reserving a life estate
to the parents, and that while a life tenant may not open
new wells, he may prevent the remainderman from drilling
for oil during the existence of the life estate. This decision
put the oil beyond the reach of all parties in interest. On
appeal the Circuit Court stated that, were it not for the
previous Illinois decisions, the deed here would have been
construed so as to permit the parents to deal with the land
as though they still had the fee. It seems to be well settled
in Illinois that such a conveyance creates a life estate in
the grantors.2 1 3
Another case of interest is Joliet and Chicago Railroad
Company v. United States, " which arose in connection
with an attempt to collect income taxes from the Joliet &
C. R. R. Co. from land alleged to be owned by them. Many
years ago this corporation had conveyed to the Chicago and
Alton on a lease form, which by its terms stated that the
grantee was "to have and hold, the said above demised and
leased premises, together with all appurtenances thereof
without reservation . . . forever. . . ." By the terms of
the lease the Chicago and Alton agreed to pay direct to the
stockholders of the Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co. 7 per
cent dividends. The grantee was to pay all taxes. The defense
was that the Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co. had no property as a basis for the tax herein sought to be imposed.
Although the Chicago and Alton entered in their books income from this road as "income from lease road" and "rent
for lease," the court held that the Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co. owned no taxable property. When all issues, rents
and profits are granted forever, the title goes with the grant.
112 F. (2d) 275 (1940) ; note, 29 Ill. B. J. 224.
Shackelton v. Sebree, 86 Ill. 616 (1877); Harshbarger v. Carroll, 163 IM. 636,
45 N.E. 565 (1896).
214 118 F. (2d) 174 (1941); note, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 147.
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It will be noticed that no rent or income was paid to the
company making the grant, but rather to stockholders as
individuals.
In Seggebruch v. Stosor,215 the Illinois Appellate Court
passed on a point involving a lease wherein premises were
leased for use as an oil station with rentals to be determined
by a percentage of sales on the demised premises. The
lessee obtained other land adjacent to these premises and
neglected the pump on the demised premises, thereby shifting the bulk of the oil business to the adjacent premises.
This cut down sales on the demised premises to a very
small amount, compared to former sales thereon when it
was operated normally. The court followed decisions in other
states 1 6 holding that business transacted on such adjacent
premises should be computed in determining the rental
charge. The decision was placed upon the proposition that
the contract implied that the lessee would diligently apply
himself on the demised premises, and that the arrangement
here involved was fraudulent as to the lessor.
The court considers remedies for breach of lease in two
217
other cases of recent decision. In Broniewicz v. Wysocki,
the defendant was in possession of the premises under a
year lease, and, having failed to pay the rent after two
months of possession, was served with a five-day notice
to vacate. The lease provided that the lessee was to pay
rent for the full term even though the lessor should re-enter.
The lessor instituted forcible entry and detainer suit. The
court said, "There is nothing illegal or improper in an agreement that the obligation of the tenant to pay all rent to
the end of the term . . . notwithstanding there has been
a re-entry for default. ' ' 21s The defendant suggested that the
notice served on him should have stated, "that unless the
rent due is paid by a specified time 'your lease will be
215

309 II. App. 385, 33 N.E. (2d) 159 (1941); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvi w

384.
216 Cissna Loan Co. v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 P. 1022 (1928); Selber Bros. v.
Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 194 La. 654, 194 So. 579 (1940); Spring Brook Ry. Co. v.
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 182 Pa. 500, 37 A. 525 (1897); Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Davis, 47 Ga. App. 601, 171 S.E. 150 (1933).
217 306 Ill. App. 187, 28 N.E. (2d) 283 (1940); note, 29 Ill. B. J. 269.
218 Quoting from Grommes v. The St. Paul Trust Co., 147 Ill. 634 (at p. 643), 35
N.E. 820 (1893).
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terminated under the terms of said lease,' or words to
that effect." Ordinarily, a tenant will not be liable for rent
after his lease has been terminated, but the court holds that
the tenant may bind himself to pay rent for the full term
if he chooses. For that reason the court regards as hypercritical, the defense of termination of the lease by re-entry.
The case seems justified on the ground that the payments
falling due after re-entry were agreed liquidated damages
for breach of tenant's contract.
In Commonwealth Building Corporation v. Hirschfield,2 19 the tenant held over one day because he could not,
or did not, obtain a conveyance to remove certain bedroom
furniture. Removal was made the day after the lease expired. The court stated that it took into consideration the
fact that the day the lease expired was a general moving
day in Chicago, when, no doubt, it would be difficult to
obtain conveyances. The court would not take notice of part
of a day. Holding over a part of a day would not seriously
jeopardize the ability of the landlord to re-lease. The lessor
notified the lessee that he was being held for another term
under the lease. The lease provided for liquidated damages
of double rent for the period that possession was withheld.
Suit was brought for a whole year's rent. Because provision
was made in the lease for this contingency, the appeal court
held for the defendant. Plaintiff's right of recovery is covered by statute220 providing that the holding over must be
willful and requiring written notice.
CONTRACTS
INSURANCE

Aside from minor statutory changes affecting the administration of insurance law,2 2' there has been no enactment or judicial decision of significant novelty during the
past year. But of interest on the facts was the case of
Obartuch v. Security Mutual Life Insurance Company.22 2
219 307 Ill.
App. 533, 30 N.E. (2d) 790 (1941); notes, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rv
305; 30 Ill.
B. J. 118.
220 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 80, § 2.
221 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 73, §§ 597, 737, 833.1, 833.2, 833.3, 833.4, 833.5, 833.6,
833.7, 833.8, 833.9, 833.10, 833.11, 833.12, 979, 1021, 1056.
222 114 F. (2d) 873 (1940).
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The action involved two life insurance policies and was defended on the ground of fraud, in that some person other
than the named assured was substituted for medical examination. To overcome this defense, the plaintiff beneficiaries relied upon the incontestable clause of the policies ("incontestable after it has been in force . . . for a period of two
years from date of issue except for non-payment of premiums . . .") and payment of premiums for more than two
years. The court held for the defendant without considering
whether the assured actually signed the application or
whether his signature had been forged, inasmuch as it
appeared conclusively that the insurance company physician
examined some person other than the named assured. As
the opinion states, "Insurance companies do not insure
names. They insure lives." The court assumed that the physician acted in good faith and was deceived by the substitution. It went on to state, however, that even if the physician
had been a party to the conspiracy, the company would not
have been bound, as he would have been acting beyond the
scope of his authority. In this regard the court cited Mutual
2 2 3 The doctrine
Life Insurance Company v. Hilton-Green.
of the Obartuch case may be summarized by a statement
that an incontestable clause does not validate an insurance
contract void ab initio for fraud, and that in Illinois, parol
evidence is admissible to show that the execution of said
22
contract was procured by fraud.

Two Illinois cases 225 have held that where an insurance
agent received sufficient cash toward the payment of a premium to pay the company, the agent might waive payment
of the balance due as his commission and receive it in property or services, but not until recently has there been a
case where the agent attempted to trade the policy for nothing but personal services and this without the company's
knowledge. In Elowe v. Superior Fire Insurance Company,22 6 the Appellate Court held the company not liable.
This is consistent with the majority view.
241 U.S. 613, 36 S. Ct. 676, 60 L. Ed. 1202 (1916).
The court cited Hicks v. Stevens, 121 IMl. 186, 11 N.E. 241 (1887).
225 Lyconing Ins. Co. v. Ward, 90 Ill. 545 (1878); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Schlink, 175 Ill. 284, 51 N.E. 795 (1898).
226 307 Ill. App. 569, 30 N.E. (2d) 953 (1941); note, 19 CHiCAco-KENT LAW RLErmw
223

224
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The extent to which knowledge and acts of an agent
are binding on an insurer was also involved in Mousette
v. Monarch Life Insurance Company.227 The insured sustained a laceration to his arm, after applying for insurance
but before the policy was delivered, which injury was discussed with both the agent and the insured's physician. It
was thought not to be at all serious, and the agent thereupon delivered the policy and received the first premium. A
few days later the insured died of infection resulting from
the injury. Recovery was allowed on the policy despite the
fact that it contained the usual clause exempting the insurer
from liability unless the policy was delivered during the
sound health of the insured. The Appellate Court held that
the company, through its agent, had received full disclosure
of the injury and by the same agent had expressed the desire to enter into the contract and had delivered the policy
and accepted the premium.2 28
In view of the increasing demand for "business insurance," Wagner v. National Engraving Company 29 is of interest. Policies were taken out on the life of each member
of a three-man corporation in the amount of $15,000. The
proceeds were to be used to buy a deceased member's stock
under the customary stock purchase agreement. It will be
generally admitted that a corporation may take out a policy
of life insurance upon an important member where his death
would cause considerable loss to it. However, one of the
policies contained a double indemnity feature of $10,000 in
case of accidental death, and it was this additional sum
which the plaintiff executrix tried to reach. While oral testimony was admitted to show that, in addition to their written
agreement, the three members had contemplated double indemnity, the result reached did not really require this evidence. The executrix failed in her claim that the corporation
had no insurable interest above and beyond the amount
227 309 Il. App. 224, 32 N.E. (2d) 1004 (1941); note, 30 Ill. B. J. 70.
228 The court cited as authority: Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schlink, 175
Ill. 284, 51 N.E. 795 (1898); Niemann v. Security Ben. Ass'n, 350 Ill. 308, 183 N.E.
223 (1932); Crawford v. Abraham Lincoln Life Ins. Co., 278 Ill. App. 576 (1934);
Froehler v. North American Life Ins. Co. of Chicago, 374 fI. 17, 27 N.E. (2d) 833
(1940).
229 307 Il. App. 509, 30 N.E. (2d) 750 (1940); notes, 26 Corn. L.Q. 497; 29 Ill.
B. J. 482.
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agreed upon for the specific purpose stated. The court indicated that the additional $10,000 might well be used for exigencies arising because of the sudden death of the insured.
An attempt to qualify as the party entitled to the proceeds of a policy was also unsuccessful in The Maccabees
v. Stone,230 where the Appellate Court was required to determine whether or not the insured resident of a home for
the aged was dependent upon the home. The insured's policy provided for payment to the named beneficiary; in the
event of the death of the beneficiary prior to the insured,
the proceeds were to be paid to the widow, if any, the children, if any, and finally (if there were no takers previously
named) to the "dependent or dependents, person or persons
upon whom the member is dependent. . . ." The insured
had entered the home under a contract which would have
permitted it to eject the resident without cause. The home
contended the contract was void, in order that it could then
show the "dependency" of the deceased resident. The court
held that the home had rendered its services to the decedent
either by virtue of the contract or as a voluntary charity,
and therefore could not qualify as the person upon whom
the insured was dependent.
BILLS AND NOTES

Two promissory note cases involving alleged "high finance" in attempts to circumvent the banking laws have
been decided by different divisions of the Appellate Court
consistently with each other and with public policy, but upon
quite different bases and by quite different techniques. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank v. W. Heller & Son 23 was decided by the Appellate Court for the second district. The
note in suit was made by a corporation and endorsed by
its officers payable to plaintiff bank. This note was the last
of a series in renewal of an original note, which was made
by the corporation and Sam Heller, one of its officers, and
endorsed by the other officers, payable to one Wynd, and
by him endorsed without recourse to the plaintiff bank. This
note had been executed as Sam Heller's contribution to the
230
231

306 IlM.App. 468, 28 N.E. (2d) 738 (1940); note, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 825.
305 I. App. 644, 27 N.E. (2d) 844 (1940).
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assets of the plaintiff bank, which was organized by the
stockholders of a defunct bank to take over its assets and
assume its liabilities, a plan evolved as an alternative to
simply responding to bank stockholders' liability. Sam Heller
had first tendered his individual note to the extent of his
liability, but the corporate note was finally given because
the other was not "bankable," and upon the representation
by the organizers that when the bank had been organized
and passed out of the hands of the bank examiners and into
those of the organizers, he would be permitted to subsitute
his individual unsecured note.
The defense was that the defendants other than Sam
Heller had signed only for the plaintiff's accommodation,
which was known to the plaintiff. It was also contended that
the plaintiff was not a holder in due course because of the
lapse of time-some fifty-seven days-between issuance of
the note and its transfer to the plaintiff bank. Judgment for
defendants was entered upon a jury verdict reached under
instructions which the Appellate Court conceded were correct. Holding that the question of whether or not the lapse
of time was unreasonable so as to preclude the plaintiff from
being a holder in due course was one of fact for the jury,
the Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a new trail
upon the ground that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
The court refused to charge plaintiff bank with knowledge of the understanding with the organizers, now directors, upon the principle that they were dealing for their own
interest and contrary to that of the bank. The court then
passed on to hold that, however these matters might be,
the defendants had waived any such defenses by entering
into the renewals. This last would seem the sounder basis
for setting aside the verdict of the jury, in view of the holding that the jury would have been justified in refusing to
hold plaintiff bank to be a holder in due course because of
the lapse of time.
The other case, Central Republic Trust Company v.
Evans,2"' decided by the second division of the Appellate
Court for the first district, involved a suit on a note signed
232

307 IlM.App. 605, 30 N.E. (2d) 921 (1941).
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individually by a number of officers of the Madison Square
State Bank. The defense was that the note had been given
as part of an elaborate conspiracy-set out in great detailon the part of the plaintiff bank, its officers, stockholders,
and affiliates to engage illegally in branch banking, by holding the stock of smaller banks, among them the Madison
Square State Bank, through an affiliate. Defendants alleged
an oral agreement with the chairman of the board of the
payee bank that the note was given merely as a matter of
form and that the makers would never be called upon to
233
pay from their.own funds.

The trial court had directed a verdict for the defendants.
The Appellate Court reversed and ordered judgment entered for the plaintiff. Again there are, seemingly, two bases
for the decision: first, that since the plaintiff has made out
a prima facie case without referring to the illegal transaction, the defendant cannot set up the illegal transaction by
way of defense; second, that to permit such a defense to be
interposed is contrary to the public policy, which "has always carefully guarded the 'well being' of banks" as "quasipublic institutions." The soundness of the first ground seems
doubtful, inasmuch as the principle there invoked is ordinarily restricted to a situation where plaintiff is attempting
to recover money or property which he owned or to which
he would have been entitled without reference to the illegal
transaction.3 4 It would seem that the court might have
done better to approach the problem with the idea that the
23 5
parties to such illegal transaction were not in pari delicto,
233 Allegedly, the proceeds of the note were to be used to purchase from the
Madison Square State Bank all of the capital "stock of Madison Square Safe
Deposit Company, a corporation which owns the bank building and premises, together with all furniture, fixtures and vault equipment located therein for the sum
of $210,000 cash." This step, i.e., of reducing and rendering more liquid the assets
of the bank, was for the purpose of facilitating acquisition of the stock of the
bank by plaintiff's affiliate. After such acquisition, it was allegedly understood
that the stock of the safety deposit company would be repurchased from the
defendants, and that such purchase money would be used to discharge the note.
234 Restatement of Law of Agency, § 412; Kearney v. Webb, 278 Ill. 17, 115 N.E.
844 (1917), where agent held money for use in gambling operations; Brady v.
Horvath, 167 Ill. 610, 47 N.E. 757 (1897); Snell, Taylor & Co. v. Pells, 113 Ill. 145
(1885), where agent received money on a contract not criminal, but contrary to
public policy; School Dist. No. 39 v. Casey, 243 Ill. App. 434 (1927), where school
director received prize on ticket received with purchase of school supplies;
Kubasiak v. Los, 190 Ill. App. 112 (1914).
235 Restatement of Law of Contracts, § 604.
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a theory which blends with the second basis for the decision,
23 6
i. e., the public interest in the bank.
Two cases involving confessions of judgment may be
noted. In Holmes v. Partridge,37 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that where a warrant of attorney to confess judgment
on a note was signed by several persons, and singular pronouns were used throughout, the warrant was not simply
"joint," but "joint and several." The court reiterated the
general proposition that warrants to confess judgment must
be strictly construed ,238 and that a "joint" warrant will not
justify confession against less than all of the signers.231 9 In
National Builders Bank of Chicago v. Simons, 20 the Appellate Court, likewise, recognized the strict construction
rule with respect to warrants to confess judgment, but sustained the execution of such warrant against an indorser,
because of the presence of special circumstances. The corporate note had been signed by the appellant as president
of the maker, as well as being indorsed by him. The warrant
expressly authorized confession against "makers, endorsers
and guarantors" and by virtue of a special agreement on
the reverse side of the note, he became "a party to" the
241
note and adopted all of its terms.
Two other cases merit mention at least. In Gillett v.
Williamsville State Bank,24 2 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that where a drawee bank accepts a check through mistake,
such acceptance may be revoked, and that whether or not
the acceptance was by mistake is a question of fact. In this
instance the drawee bank had cancelled the check but had
not debited the drawer's account. In O'Connor v. Central
Ibid., § 601.
237 375 Ill. 521, 31 N.E. (2d) 948 (1941).
Mayer v. Pick, 192 Ill. 561, 61 N.E. 416 (1901); Frye v. Jones, 78 Ill. 627
(1875); Trucker v. Gill, 61 Ill. 236 (1869).
239 Keen v. Bump, 286 Iml. 11, 121 N.E. 251 (1918); Mayer v. Pick, 192 Ill. 561, 61
N.E. 416 (1901).
240 307 Ill. App. 552, 31 N.E. (2d) 269 (1940).
241 "For value received, the undersigned and each of the undersigned in addition to the obligations imposed by indorsement and waiving all notices of every
character and nature, hereby become a party to, adopt, agree to, accept, guarantee and assume all the terms, conditions and waivers contained in the note on the
reverse side hereof, guarantee the payment of said note at maturity and consent
without notice of any kind to any and all extensions of time made by the holder
of said note. Nothing except cash payment to the holder of said note shall release
the undersigned or any of the undersigned. Robert L. Simons."
242 310 Ill. App. 395, 34 N.E. (2d) 552 (1941).
236
238
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National Bank & Trust Company,243 the Appellate Court
seemingly held a registered bond negotiable, but held against
the bank which had purchased the bond from a converter
on the ground that the bank was not an innocent party. Although the result was doubtless correct and can be justified
on other grounds,24 4 it seems clear that the court erred in
assuming that the bond was negotiable, inasmuch as it is
payable to the "registered owner" and not to "order or to

bearer.'

'245

MISCELLANEOUS

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Robert Gordon, Inc., v. Ingersoll-Rand Company,246 indicated that the doctrine of promissory estoppel might be applied under circumstances such as the following: A manufacturer makes an offer to a contractor to sell him materials he will need for a construction job on which he is
bidding, and, after the bid is made in reliance on the manufacturer's offer but before the contractor's acceptance of it,
the offer is terminated. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand writing the decision,
rejected the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to such a case in James Baird Company v. Gimbel
Brothers, Inc.247 In the opinion of Judge Kerner in the Seventh Circuit case, he says, "We choose not to follow the
Baird case." The statement was dictum, however, since on
the facts of the case the doctrine could not be applied because justifiable reliance and irreparable detriment-necessary to promissory estoppel-were lacking.
The Illinois Appellate Court, in an action by a subcontractor against the surety on the bond of a contractor employed by a school board, denied the subcontractor a right
of action as third party beneficiary under the common law
theory, but recognized the plaintiff's claim under a statutory
306 Ill. App. 414, 28 N.E. (2d) 755 (1940); note, 29 Ill. B. J. 261.
I.e., estoppel with respect to nonnegotiable registered bond not available to
one who is not innocent party. See discussion of this point in note, 29 fli. B. J. 261.
245 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 98, § 21: "An instrument payable in money to be
negotiated must conform to the following requirements: . . . 4. Must be payable
"
to the order of a specified person or to bearer ....
243
244

246

117 F.

(2d) 654 (1941).

247

64 F. (2d) 344 (1933).
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provision... that requires government units to demand of
the contractor a bond conditioned for the payment of all
labor and material whether furnished by a subcontractor or
not.2 49 Since a satisfactory solution was reached, criticism
may seem useless; but this decision might influence later
decisions on bonds for contractors not doing public work. It
is felt that the court could have allowed a recovery on the
common law theory more readily than on the statutory one.
The court denied a recovery on the former theory because
it found no intent to benefit the subcontractor. But it is
submitted that the bond and contract disclosed as much intent to benefit as was declared to be necessary in Carson
Pirie Scott & Company v. Parrett,50 a case involving not
a contractor's surety bond but a guaranty contract on facts
sufficiently similar to have controlled the decision in the
instant case. The defendant's argument to the plaintiff's
claim as based on the statute was that, while the statute
required the contractor to furnish a bond which would protect the subcontractor, the board of education here did not
actually require such a bond and the contractor did not in
fact furnish such a one. There is some merit to the contention, but it is not likely to be made again, for the last
Legislature added an amendment to the statute providing
that the bond shall be deemed to contain the required provision whether or not it actually contains it. 25 '
In People v. Chicago Lawn State Bank,2 52 the Appellate
Court held that a surety company which had made good
the loss of public funds in a closed bank was subrogated to
the preferential rights of the sovereign as against the debtor
bank. This is, of course, a proper application of a well accepted principle to a somewhat novel situation. In this particular case, however, the surety was denied priority to the
claim for want of proof that the funds in question were in
fact undistributed tax funds and so entitled under the statute to such priority.2 53
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 29, § 15.
Fodge v. Board of Education of the Village of Oak Park, 309 Ill. App. 109, 32
N.E. (2d) 650 (1941).
250 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498, 81 A. L. R. 1262 (1931).
251 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 29, § 15.
252 306 Ill. App. 107, 28 N.E. (2d) 294 (1940); note, 29 Ill. B. J. 188.
253 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 36, §§ 17, 21 and 22.
248
249
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The Supreme Court, in Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Company,254 reversed the decision of the Appellate Court.2 55
The latter had held that liability on an express warranty
was made out where a salesgirl in the defendant's store had
called attention to the words, "Run-proof-harmless" printed on a card to which the manufacturer had attached a
tube of mascara. The Supreme Court pointed out what the
Appellate Court had disregarded: regardless of whether or
not the salesgirl's statement could have been considered an
express warranty, it was made after the sale and did not
induce it.
The Illinois Appellate Court recently held void for illegality
an agreement by which a frontage consent was given for
the erection of a gasoline filling station in return for a covenant not to use an adjoining vacant tract but rather to create
and maintain a lawn thereon. 5 6 The decision was based
upon prior decisions holding void frontage consents given
for a money consideration. The court apparently took no
notice of the fact that the reason for holding illegal the
previous agreements was because the public might be injured where a frontage consent is given solely for personal
gain, while in the instant case the restrictive covenant would
inure to the benefit of all property holders in the neighborhood.
TORTS

Two cases involving guest passengers may be worthy
of mention. In Connett v. Winget257 the Illinois Supreme
Court has given an interesting definition of a "guest passenger" as used by statute."' The court said:
In determining whether a person is a guest within the meaning of the
"Guest statutes" in the several States, consideration is given to the
person or persons advantaged by the carriage; if it confers only a benefit incident to hospitality, companionship or the like, the passenger is
a guest, but if the carriage tends to promote mutual interests of both the
person carried and the driver, or if the carriage is primarily for the
254 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.

(2d) 427 (1941).
255 306 Ill. App. 384, 28 N.E. (2d) 804 (1940); notes, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw RE'vEW
210; 29 Ill. B. J. 149; 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 398; 25 Minn. L. Rev. 246.
256 Lain v. Rennert, 308 Ill. App. 572, 32 N.E. (2d) 375 (1941); notes, 19 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEw 376; 30 11. B. J. 113.
257 374 IIl. 531, 30 N.E. (2d) 1 (1940); notes, 30 IIl. B. J. 64, 66.
258 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 95%, § 58a.
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attainment of some objective or purpose of the operator, the passenger
is not a guest within the meaning of such enactments.

The court distinguishes between the meanings of "guest" and
"passenger" and finds that all are not guests who do not
pay for their ride; that the intention of the passenger alone
does not determine whether he becomes a guest, inasmuch
as the invitation and the purpose of the ride may originate
wholly with the owner of the automobile.
McGraw v. Oelig2 59 was an action by an administrator
to recover for the wrongful death of his intestate. The court
appears to have imputed to the intestate the negligence of
the driver of the car in which intestate was a guest passenger
at the time of his death, on the ground that the driver was
a brother of the decedent, and as next of kin, entitled to a
distributive share in any recovery.
The "attractive nuisance" doctrine has received attention
if not appreciable clarification. Harrison v. City of Chicago'6° is an apparent extension of the liability of a municipal corporation under the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
Here, the city was held liable for injuries to a child, who,
with another child, was playing on and around a stand which
was owned and operated by a news vendor in accordance with
a permit duly issued by the city. One of the children, swinging on the stand, tipped it over upon the plaintiff, causing
the injuries. In an interesting dissent, Mr. Justice Burke
points out that a newspaper stand is not inherently dangerous, and that it could not reasonably be anticipated that children would swing upon it. His comment to the effect that,
on the reasoning of the majority opinion, anything that a
child could swing from, even a parked automobile, would be
an attractive nuisance, is interesting in view of Schlatter v.
26 1 where the court refused to find that a
City of Peoria
parked garbage truck was an attractive nuisance. The truck
carried a trailer which was equipped with a footrest, upon
which the plaintiff's intestate, a child eight years old, climbed while truck and trailer were parked. When they were subsequently put in motion, the child fell off, was run over by
the trailer and killed.
259 309 Ill.
App. 628, 33 N.E. (2d) 758 (1941).
260 308 Ill. App. 263, 31 N.E. (2d) 359 (1941).
261 309 Ill. App. 636, 33 N.E. (2d) 730 (1941).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

However, the court followed former Illinois decisions in
Shapiro v. City of Chicago,26 2 in holding an abandoned automobile to be an attractive nuisance, and imposing liability
upon the city which had notice thereof. The plaintiff, a boy
six years old, was playing in the alley where the automobile
had been abandoned, when a playmate threw a lighted match
into the gasoline tank, causing an explosion. It is difficult
to find complete consistency in these three latest "attractive nuisance" cases.
Some inconsistency may, perhaps, be found also in the
recent cases where liability was sought to be imposed under
the Dram Shop Act.263 In Klopp v. Benevolent Protective
Order of Elks,26 4 the court held that defendant's claim that
it was purely a charitable organization and therefore not
liable under the act was without merit, since it maintained
a licensed bar at which liquor was sold. This case also holds
that intoxicating liquor need not be the sole cause of the
injury to entitle the plaintiff to recovery under the act, and
that to construe the act otherwise would fall short of the
measure of remedy intended.
In James v. Wicker,26 5 however, the court appears to
have reduced, materially, the measure of remedy intended
under the act. The court here denied recovery on the ground
that the plaintiff herself was intoxicated when she accepted
the invitation of the intoxicated defendant to ride as a passenger in his car. This case would appear to be authority to the
effect that an intoxicated person may assume the risk despite
an intoxicated condition which would negative the ability to
appreciate it, or, in the alternative, that contributory negligence is a defense to an action founded upon absolute liability, neither of which propositions, it is submitted, have
previously been the law in Illinois. James v. Wicker becomes
still more difficult to reconcile in view of the subsequent case
of Thompson v. Wogan,"6 where the same court held that
an action under the Dram Shop Act is not, in any sense, a
common law negligence action, and that the manifest in262 308 IlM. App. 613, 32 N.E. (2d) 338 (1941).

Ill.
309
265 309
266 309
263

264

Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 43, § 135.
Ill. App. 145, 33 N.E. (2d) 161 (1941).
Ill. App. 397, 33 N.E. (2d) 169 (1941).
Ill. App. 413, 33 N.E. (2d) 151 (1941).
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tention of the legislature in adopting the act was to create
liability in a class of cases in which there was no liability
at common law. It is submitted that the Thompson case is
much more consistent with the previous Illinois Dram Shop
Act cases, wherein it has repeatedly been held that the act
must be so construed as to carry out the manifest intent
of the legislature, i.e., to impose liability upon persons who
contribute to intoxication subsequently resulting in damage
by the intoxicated persons to another.
The only res ipsa loquitur case found worthy of comment
is Brooks v. Hill-Shaw Co., 6 7 involving the explosion of a
glass coffee-maker, commonly known as a "Vaculator,"
which was partly filled with hot water and coffee. The court
refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The case
can, however, easily be reconciled with those in which the
doctrine has been applied to exploding soda bottles and the
like. The plaintiff's claim was that the utensil which exploded was a new one, purchased only a day or two before,
but on trial, was unable to establish this fact to the satisfaction of the court. She admitted that she had several others
which had been in use for several months. The broken utensil was in evidence and the court found, from the condition
of a rubber gasket which was a part thereof, evidence that
the utensil might have been in her possession, and hence,
under her management and control, for a considerable period.
Several other miscellaneous tort cases may be worthy of
very brief notice. In Trust Co. of Chicago v. Lewis Auto
Sales, Inc.,16 the plaintiff attempted to impose liability for
injury to a pedestrian upon the conditional vendor of the automobile which caused the accident, although driven at the
time by the conditional vendee, on the ground that the vendor
was negligent in selling the car, knowing that the brakes
were defective. There was evidence to show that the conditional purchaser also knew of the defective brakes, had returned the car several times to the vendor for repair, but
that the vendor had been unable to make the brakes effective. In refusing to hold the conditional vendor liable, the
117 IF. (2d) 682 (1941).
268 306 IMI.App. 132, 28 N.E. (2d) 300 (1941); note, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 162.
267

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

court suggested a moral obligation, but found no legal obligation existing on the part of the conditional vendor to the
pedestrian. The court appears to have predicated its decision,
not upon the point that the dealer could not have anticipated
the injury, but that its duty was merely to inform the buyer
of the defective brakes, which the defendant in this case had
done.
Partridgev. Enterprise Transfer Company2 69 is interesting only as to the limitation on the "right of way" rule contained in the instructions which the court held proper. The
instruction was:
The Court instructs the jury that while the law gives the right of way
to vehicles approaching along intersecting highways from the right over
those approaching from the left, the law does not contemplate that such
right may arise when the vehicle from the right is so far from the intersection at the time the car from the left enters upon it, that, with both
vehicles running within the lawful limits of speed the vehicle on the
left will reach the line of crossing before the other will reach the intersection and if you believe from the preponderance of the evidence that
at the time the automobile of the plaintiff entered the intersection in
question, the truck of the defendant was so far from the intersection
that with both vehicles running within the lawful limits of speed the
plaintiff's automobile would reach the line of crossing before the defendant's truck would reach the intersection, then you are instructed
that the said defendant's truck did not have the right of way.

In Schiermeier v. Hoeffken2 70 the defendant was held
liable for negligence resulting in injury to a trespasser, on
the ground that this defense was not available to a defendant who had no interest in the property upon which the plaintiff was alleged to have trespassed.
Drake v. Thomas2 71 extends the privilege of family discipline and corporal punishment to a school-teacher, on the
ground that the authority of a teacher over a pupil is a
delegation of parential authority.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

The practitioner must take notice of several new statutory offenses created during the recent session of the legis269 307 IMl. App. 386, 30 N.E. (2d) 947 (1940).
270 309 Ill.
App. 250, 33 N.E. (2d) 147 (1941).
271 310 IMI.App. 57, 33 N.E. (2d) 889 (1941).
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lature. Knowingly entering a horse in a horse race within
twenty-four hours after such horse has been drugged,2 72 and
entering, or causing to be entered, any horse by any other
name or designation than the registered one, are now both
condemned.2 73 Doing business under an assumed or trade
name without having registered certain essential information with regard thereto has also been made criminal.2 74 The
possession, or carrying, of tear gas devices, except by certain authorized persons, have been brought within the terms
of the Deadly Weapons Act.2 75 The prohibition against the
use of explosives to destroy buildings has been expanded to
cover other forms of tangible property.2 76 Abuse of the processes of garnishment by making demand on the employee
and employer without first having secured judgment and
having had execution returned unsatisfied is now made a
misdemeanor. 277 In the 1939 amendment to the crime of
trespass to land, the legislature provided punishment by fine
and imprisonment.2 7 The latter form of punishment has
2 79
now been deleted..
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that voluntary communication by a private citizen with the grand jury, through
other than authorized channels, is to be regarded as a criminal contempt of court.2 80 The disavowal of any intention to
"insult" either the court or the grand jury will not constitute
any justification for such conduct, although it may be considered in mitigation of the offense. Prosecutions under the
Illinois Securities Act 28 ' must be based on the unlawful sale
Prior thereto only the
272 Laws, 1941, 51; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 8, § 37h(2).
conduct of the person administering the drug was criminal under Ill. Rev. Stat.
1939, Ch. 8, § 37hl (1).
273 Laws, 1941, 52; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 8, § 37h1(3).
274 Laws, 1941, 550; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 96, § 4-8.
275 Laws, 1941, 554; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 152a.
276 Laws, 1941, 555; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 237.
277 Laws, 1941, 817; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 62, § 4.
278 Laws, 1939, 514; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 565.
279 Laws, 1941, 574; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 565.
cert. den.-U.S.-,
280 People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524, 30 N.E. (2d) 11 (1940),
61 S. Ct. 836, 85 L. Ed. 748; notes, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 561; 30 Ill. B. J. 67. See
also People v. McDonnell, 307 Ill. App. 368, 30 N.E. (2d) 80 (1940), noted in 30
Ill. B. J. 67, affirmed in 377 Ill. 568, 37 N.E. (2d) 159 (1941), in which attorney's
unintentional absence during trial of a capital case, causing mistrial, was deemed
contemptuous, the question of intent being available only for purpose of mitigation.
281 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121 , § 96 et seq.
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of securities covered thereby, but in such prosecutions the
state is now not obliged to allege and prove that the defendant's conduct was not within one of the many exemptions therein created. Such exemption, if existing, must be
proved by the defendant according to People v. Wilson,2 82
which rejects dictum in People v. Johnson28 3 purporting
to place the burden on the prosecution.
The Habitual Criminal Act,2 84 providing for maximum
punishment whenever a person has previously been convicted, among other offenses, for grand larceny, was held
inapplicable in People v. Sarosiek8 5 to a situation involving
a prior conviction of larceny from the person, 286 even though
such prior offense is, for purpose of punishment, regarded
as grand larceny,8 7 in the absence of any showing that the
value of the property. so taken from the person exceeded
$15. Analogy in support of such decision was drawn from
an earlier case involving a prior conviction for theft of a
motor vehicle, which, under People v. Crane,2s8 is to be
regarded as a separate and distinct offense from grand larceny, 28 9 and hence not properly the basis for the application
of the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act. Following
such decisions, the legislature amended the act in question
to include earlier convictions for larceny of a motor vehicle,
larceny from the person, rape, arson, kidnaping, confidence
game, and extortion by threats, whenever the punishment
therefor was by imprisonment in the penitentiary, so as to
become the basis for a charge that the defendant is an habit290
ual criminal within the purview of such act.
An unexpected turn appears to have been given to the
offense of larceny by bailee 291 by the decision in People v.
Moses 291 in which the defendant had received an automo282 375 Ill. 506, 31 N.E. (2d) 959 (1941). Defendant relied on the ground that the
sale in question was exempt under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121 , § 100 (1) covering
class "B" securities sold in good faith by a vendor who was not an issuer, underwriter or promoter. Held: The burden of proof was on defendant, as being a negative averment peculiarly within his knowledge.
283 355 Ill. 380, 189 N.E. 271 (1934).
284 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 602.
285 375 Ill. 631, 32 N.E. (2d) 311 (1941).
286 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 387.
287 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 389.
288 356 Ill. 276, 190 N.E. 355 (1934).
289 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 388a with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38,
§ 389.
290 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 573, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 602.
291 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 394.
292 375 Ill. 336, 31 N.E. (2d) 585 (1941); note, 29 Ill. B. J. 479.
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bile from the prosecuting witness with directions to sell the
same and to apply the proceeds toward the purchase of a
smaller car. The defendant did sell as directed though he
never accounted for the proceeds, yet his conviction on a
charge of larceny by bailee of an automobile was affirmed.
It would seem as though reversal thereof would have been
proper for failure of the indictment to correspond with the
proof.2 93
Very slight modification of the law relating to criminal
procedure has occurred. The effect of the decision in People
v. Scornavache,294 which required the State to consent to
the waiver of a jury trial in a criminal case, has been removed by a brief statutory provision giving that right exclusively to the defendant.2 9 In yielding jurisdiction over
lands acquired by the United States, the State has reserved
the right to make arrests thereon of persons violating state
laws.2 96 A complete revision has been made of the Prison
and Parole Act, the principal change therein being one which
permits the trial court to fix a minimum punishment in excess of the legal minimum, though less than the maximum,
which shall control the right to parole unless amended by
the concurrence of four of the five members of the Division
of Correction and approved by the Director of the Department of Public Safety. 29 7 Furthermore, the power to grant
probation to persons convicted of the crime of incest is here298
after denied to the trial court.
The following cases also presented some important problems regarding criminal procedure. Thus, upon the amendment of the Jurors Act, making women eligible for jury
service,29 9 the defendant in a certain criminal case moved
to quash the indictment because there was no woman on
the grand jury which returned the same. The Supreme Court,
293 People v. Kennedy, 356 Ill. 151, 190 N.E. 296 (1934), an indictment for theft
of money not supported by proof of larceny of checks.
294 347 ll. 403, 179 N.E. 909, 79 A L. R. 553 (1931).
295 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 574; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 736. If trial by jury
in a criminal case is but a privilege accorded the defendant and not an integral
part of the governmental structure [People ex rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250,
172 N.E. 722 (1930)], it would logically follow that he, and he alone, should be
the one to determine whether to insist on such privilege or waive it.
296 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 1303; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 143, § 30.
297 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, pp. 560 et seq.; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, §§ 801 et seq.
298 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 570; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 785.
299 Laws 1939, p. 691; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 78, § 1.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

°° held the mere
in People v. Fognini,1
omission of women
in the composition of the grand jury was not enough to warrant quashing the indictment,3"' though they refused to determine whether women may or must be called to serve on
grand juries."' To obviate the doubt thus raised, the legislature passed an emergency amendment to the statute specifically making women eligible for such service. 30 3
Though the Attorney General is recognized as the chief
law officer of the state, °4 his right to interpose in criminal
prosecutions is limited to consulting with and advising the
local state's attorney. 5 Under the decision in People v.
Flynn3 6 such right does not extend to taking exclusive
charge of the proceedings before the grand jury, in the absence of any showing that the local state's attorney was
disqualified; 30 7 hence, an indictment procured under such
circumstances must be quashed. The court in charge of the
grand jury may not, by designating the Attorney General
3 08
as the "officer" to attend the sessions of the grand jury,
prevent the local state's attorney from exercising the statu30 9
tory powers of his office.
While a petition for change of venue is, generally, not
available in proceedings to punish for contempt of court,310
a motion may be made for an assignment of the cause to
another judge, according to People ex rel. Rusch v. Cun-

300 374 Ill. 161, 28 N.E. (2d) 95 (1940).
301 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935), distinguished on ground of a settled policy, therein shown, deliberately to exclude
negroes.
302 The court called attention to the fact that the amendment of 1939 referred
solely to petit jurors, since Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 78, § 9, providing for the grand
jury, makes no cross-references to the amended section 1. In a later case, People
v. Thurman, 377 Ill. 453, 36 N.E. (2d) 747 (1941), subsequent to the period of this
survey, the court held an indictment returned prior to the present amendment
valid even though the vote of certain women members of the grand jury was
essential to secure its return.
303 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 841; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 78, § 9.
304 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. V, § 1.
305 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 14, § 4(4).
306 375 Ill. 366, 31 N.E. (2d) 591 (1941). People v. Looney, 314 Ill. 150, 145 N.E.
365 (1924) was held not applicable under the facts of the case.
307 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 14, § 6.
308 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 711.
309 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 14, § 5.
310 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 146, § 18, permits change of venue in proceedings by
indictment or information, but the information for contempt is not covered thereby. Crook v. People, 16 fll. 534 (1855). Specific provision is made in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1941, Ch. 146, § 21a, for change of venue in contempt proceedings where the prosecution is based on attacks upon the character or conduct of the judge, but not
otherwise.
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ningham,8 1 ' if it appears that the judge against whom the
contempt was committed is otherwise disqualified. In that
case, certain election officials were proceeded against for
alleged misbehavior in the conduct of a primary election at
which the county judge was himself a candidate. Pointing
out that such fact made him personally interested, it was
held that to allow him to hear such cause would violate the
canon against one being both a party and a judge in the
same cause; hence the said judge was required to grant
such motion and thereby, in effect, grant a change of venue.
The necessity of preserving the distinction between the
function of the judiciary on the one hand, and that of the
executive department on the other, was stressed in People
ex Tel. Day v. Lewis,"' in which, by habeas corpus, the
relator sought to test the validity of the forfeiture by the
Department of Public Welfare of his statutory good time
allowance. The conduct leading to such forfeiture, the killing
of a fellow-inmate of the penitentiary, had been made the
basis of separate criminal proceedings resulting in relator's
acquittal thereof. It was contended, therefore, that such acquittal demonstrated no fault on relator's part, and hence
deprived the Department of any ground for forfeiture. In
the absence of arbitrary action, the granting or withholding
of credit for good behavior is within the exclusive power of
the executive department; hence, it is not open to judicial review.113 It was held consequently that the determination by
the judicial department that relator's conduct was noncriminal in no way bound the other branch of the government
nor prevented the latter from making a separate and a different decision thereon.
REMEDIES
CIVIL PRACTICE

Neither the legislature nor the courts have been idle
during the past year in their efforts to make the judicial
process into a more efficient, more understandable system
311 308 Ill. App. 63, 31 N.E. (2d) 369 (1941). Companion cases involving parallel
problems are People ex rel. Rusch v. Steiner, 308 Il. App. 60, 31 N.E. (2d) 372
(1941) and People ex rel. Rusch v. Molie, 308 Ill. App. 44, 31 N.E. (2d) 373 (1941).
312 376 I1. 509, 34 N.E. (2d) 712 (1941).
313 People ex rel. Titzel v. Hill, 344 Ill. 246, 176 N.E. 360 (1931).
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for the solution of legal conflicts. In the following materials
the evidence of such efforts is arranged roughly in the order
approximating that which a lawyer would follow in presenting a client's case.
The Theory and Scope of the Case
A new statutory form of action has been provided3 14
for the enforcement of liens, in amounts of $25 or less,
upon chattels, in favor of the person who has expended labor, services, skill or material thereon, by permitting a public sale of the chattel, upon a single publication of certain
essential data, after a ten-day redemption period has expired. Any surplus arising from the sale is to be deposited
with the county treasurer for the account of the owner, and
compliance with the act shall constitute a bar to any action
to recover the chattel. Common law methods for the enforcement of such lien still remain.
The hope for a change in the law relating to separate
recoveries in cases involving wrongful death, the first for
the death itself and the second to recover damages to the
estate, has been extinguished by the decision in Susemiehl
v. Red River Lumber Company,315 which reaffirms the earlier decision in Holton v. Daly,3 16 so that all damages caused
must be recovered in the one action or else be deemed
waived.
An oral promise to pay an unwritten obligation barred
by the five-year statute of limitations 317 is regarded as
enough to revive the same, 18 but it was previously the
rule that a similar parole promise would be insufficient to
revive a judgment, whether domestic or foreign, once the
same had become barred. 1 9 Upon re-examination of the
latter point, it was held in Truscon Steel Company of Canada, Ltd. v. Biegler320 that such rule was inapplicable to a
suit brought upon a foreign judgment, so that, if, within
five years, a new promise has been made to pay the same,
Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 849; Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 82, §§ 47a, et seq.
376 Ill. 138, 33 N.E. (2d) 211 (1941) affirming 305 Ill. App. 473, 27 N.E. (2d)
285 (1940). Note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVmW 110.
316 106 Ill. 131 (1882).
317 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 16.
318 Abdill v. Abdill, 292 IMl. 231, 126 N.E. 543 (1920).
319 Ludwig v. Huck, 45 Ill. App. 651 (1892).
320 306 IMI.App. 180, 28 N.E. (2d) 623 (1940).
314
315
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the fact that the judgment itself is barred will not prevent
an action, as in debt, to recover the amount due.
Though, generally, a court will not entertain moot proceedings, it was held in People ex rel. Courtney v. Botts,321
that quo warranto proceedings do not become moot even
though the term of office which is the subject of the inquiry
may have expired pending the outcome of such proceedings.
Comfort may be derived by the proponents of the claim
that equity and law have been consolidated in Illinois 322
from the decision in Westerfield v. Redmer,3 23 in which
case an equitable action for specific performance was originally instituted, but the chancellor, upon finding that no
ground for equitable relief existed, proceeded to treat the
cause as a suit for breach of contract and awarded money
damages. The contention that such action was highly improper, predicated upon the decisions rendered under the
earlier system involving distinct separation between law
and equity, 2 4 was rejected by reason of the provisions of
Section 31 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 2 5 and the applicable rules of the Illinois Supreme Court,3 26 particularly
since the defendants had made no demand for a jury trial,
nor protested the action of the court in deciding the legal
issues. The remark that, "It would be useless to send the
case back to the trial court to have the chancellor enter an
order that he should hear it [the case] through his legal
instead of his equitable ear ' 327 seemed sufficient to dispose
of all argument. Does it not seem, however, slightly unfair
to the defendant to notify him, by the endorsement on the
complaint, that the suit is one on equitable grounds, to
821 376 MIl.476, 34 N.E. (2d) 403 (1941).
322 See "Equity and 'Fusion' in Illinois,"

18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVMW 333
(1940), and, particularly, works noted on p. 355 thereof.
323 310 Ill.
App. 246, 33 N.E. (2d) 744 (1941).
324 Toledo, St. Louis and New Orleans R. Co. v. St. Louis and Ohio River R.
Co., 208 Ill.
623, 70 N.E. 715 (1904).
325 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 155, which abolishes the distinctions respecting
the manner of pleading between actions at law and suits in equity.
326 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.9, requiring endorsement of the complaint
as being "at law" or "in chancery"; §259.10, permitting the consolidation of
equitable claims in one complaint without the use of the count system;
nd
§ 259.11, permitting the joinder of legal and equitable causes in one complaint
under separate designations, with further provision for separate hearings; especially where a jury demand has been made.
327 310 Ill.
App. 246 (at p. 250), 33 N.E. (2d) 744 (at p. 746) (1941).
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which, in all probability no jury demand would be proper,
and then, because accidental allegations in the complaint
will support relief at law, to convert the action, at the hearing, into an instrument for the enforcement thereof? It
should also be remembered that, in a community like Cook
County, the nisi prius judges are assigned to hear only certain types of cases, 328 although they are, of course, competent to pass on any business properly before the court. May
not such additional fact serve to put the defendant off guard?
Despite a provision in a contract that, upon breach, the
plaintiff might procure a temporary injunction without notice
and without bond, it was held in Wagner v. Okner 329 that
such provision should not be allowed to override the clear
language of the statute 330 denying the right to grant an injunction unless the complaint, or affidavit accompanying the
same, shows that undue prejudice will occur if such injunction be not issued immediately and without notice.
33 2
A slight change has been made in the Limitations Act
so as to require that litigation which would survive the death
of the person against whom the same might be brought must,
in the event of his death prior to suit, be instituted against
his executor or administrator within nine months after issuance of letters. 33 The representative still has one year
from the date of death in which to file suit upon any claim
belonging to the decedent which had not been barred in his
lifetime, although the period of limitation might expire within
such year. The change is doubtless intended to make the
statute conform to the claims section of the Administration
334
Act.
Another new provision in the Limitations Act 33 5 provides
that no deed, will, estate, proof of heirship, plat, affidavit, or
328 Rules, Circuit Court of Cook County, as amended May 1, 1939, Title I, rules
1 and 2.
329 306 Ill. App. 601, 29 N.E. (2d) 385 (1940). McSurely, J., dissenting.
330 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 69, § 3.
331 Language in Kessie v. Talcott, 305 Ill. App. 627, 27 N.E. (2d) 857 (1940), to
the effect that, upon finding the injunction was improvidently issued because of
lack of notice, the reviewing court must reverse the order without consideration
of the merits of the case, was ordered modified in Wagner v. Okner, 306 Ill. App.
601, 29 N.E. (2d) 385 (1940), to allow the reviewing court an opportunity to consider the merits in order to determine if notice was, in fact, necessary.
333 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 851.
332 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 20.
334 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 356.
335 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 854; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 10a.
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other document, or any court record, or any agreement, or
any fact, event, or statement relating to or affecting titles
to real estate, occurring more than seventy-five years prior
to the effective date of the amendment shall adversely affect
the title to real estate.33 6 The limitation does not apply or
operate against the United States, the State of Illinois, or any
other state, or to land held by a municipality for public purposes, or in favor of vendees or lessees as against their
vendors or lessors, nor does it bar any person who, during
the period within which title might be reasserted, did not
have the right to sue for and protect his title.
33 7
Pursuant to rule of the Municipal Court of Chicago
the defendant in Universal Credit Company v. Antonsen3 8
was ordered to reveal the whereabouts of the res, and, upon
refusal so to do, was punished for contempt of court. On appeal the decision was reversed on the ground that such rule
was unconstitutional as being not merely a rule of procedure,
but actually created an additional remedy to those already
provided by the Replevin Act.33 9 The court distinguished the
situation from one in which the defendant interfered with
the property after official seizure thereof, which conduct,
even without a rule, would be contempt of court.
The Initial or Pleading Stages
Over seven years of experience with the sections of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act relating to the preparation of, and
objections to, the pleadings in a civil case has resulted in
smoothing most of the difficulties. Occasional debatable
points do, however, arise. Thus a former provision of the act
read as follows: "Every civil action, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute shall be commenced by the issuance of summons. ' ' 340 A foreclosure suit was instituted
but no summons was issued therein as all defendants filed a
336 The period may be extended an additional ten years if a written claim is
recorded (a) within three years after the effective date of the act; or (b) within
three years prior to the expiration of the limitation period; or (c) after the
period has run and within two years after removal of disability or within two
years after the appointment of a guardian or conservator.
337 Now Rule 71 of the Revised Municipal Court Rules, in force July 1, 1940.
338 374 Ill.194, 29 N.E. (2d) 96 (1940), reversing 301 Ill.App. 334, 22 N.E. (2d)
790 (1939); notes, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 190; 19 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw

64; 35 Ill.
L. Rev. 988.
339 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 119, § 18.

340 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1935, Ch. 110, § 129.
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written appearance. Subsequently a suit was filed to remove
such proceedings, and the action taken thereunder, as a cloud
on the title, the plaintiff contending the same were null and
void on the ground that the court never acquired jurisdiction
by reason of noncompliance with such provision. It was held
in Koberlein v. The First National Bank of St. EImo03 4 1 that
failure to issue summons under such circumstances did
not prevent the court from acquiring jurisdiction, and that
hence the earlier proceedings were valid. Since 1937, a civil
action is commenced in Illinois by the filing of a complaint; 3 " therefore, the identical problem cannot now arise.
Heretofore, when any person was made a defendant under the designation of an "unknown owner," the practitioner
was obliged to file two separate affidavits at the commencement of the suit; one to establish the fact that such person's name was unknown, the other for the purpose of showing nonresidence, to support service by publication. 43 The
two statements may now be contained in the one affidavit
provided it is drafted in such manner as to enable the court
to distinguish between the two subjects. 3 4 The right of the
litigant to name as "unknown owners" all defendants whose
names are unknown must be carefully exercised in the light
of Callner v. Greenberg4 5 which, reiterating the caution
34
laid down in Graham v. O'Connor,
decided under the
former practice, notes that such proceedings, if fraudulently
brought, may not operate to destroy the rights of such
"unknown" persons.
The doctrine announced in Zielinski v. Pleason47 that
the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant party
is not enough to warrant reversal unless it be made to appear that some injustice has thereby been committed, was
practically nullified by Kroot v. Liberty Bank of Chicago,348
in which a decree was reversed, even though the infant was
841 376 Ill. 450, 34 N.E. (2d) 388 (1941).
342 Laws 1937, p. 989; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 129.
843 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 153 and § 138.
844 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 1018; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 153a.
845 376 IMl. 212, 33 N.E. (2d) 437 (1941); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 387.
846 350 IMl. 36, 182 N.E. 764 (1932).
347 299 IlM. App. 594, 20 N.E. (2d) 620 (1939); note, 17 CHICAGo-KENT LAw

RzvxEw 383.
348 307 Ill. App. 209, 30 N.E. (2d)
CmcAw-KENT LAw REvmw 299.

92 (1940),

Burke, J., dissenting; note, 19
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represented by a guardian ad litem, merely because the latter filed an answer admitting the allegations of the complaint. More energetic conduct on the part of the guardian
ad litem, rather than a tendency to dispense with his services, seems now to be the required policy.
The validity of personal service of a summons in a civil
action when made on a Sunday was questioned in Pedersen
v. Logan Square State & Savings Bank,3 4 and regarded, by
the Appellate Court, First District, as being improper by
reason of a provision in the Criminal Code 5 0 forbidding any
disturbance of the peace by unnecessary labor on the Sabbath. Though noting earlier decisions in Illinois which hold
that ministerial acts by judicial officers may be performed
on that day, the court deemed that service of process, being
the initial step to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the de-.
fendant, was essentially a judicial act and hence within the
common law principle that no judicial act may be performed
35'
on a dies non juridicus.
The effectiveness of the procedural devices provided by
Section 48 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act and by Rule 21
of the Illinois Supreme Court 352 for testing an attack on the
jurisdiction of the court on account of lack of service of
process on defendant and for permitting his continued participation in the case, in the event such attack fails, without
involving a submission to such jurisdiction, was dem3 5
onstrated in Albers v. Bramberg,
1 in which case the defendant, despite a judgment against him on the merits, was
able to secure a reversal thereof because the purported
service was invalid.3 54 The lesson of Brandt v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company3 5 seems to have been thoroughly
learned.
349 309 Il. App. 54, 32 N.E. (2d) 644 (1941); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw
278. The case was reversed, and service held good, in 377 IlM.408, 36 N.E. (2d) 732
(1941), subsequent to the period of this survey. See note, post, this issue.
350 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 549.
351 Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. 368 (1846).
352 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 172 and § 259.21.
853 308 Ill. App. 463, 32 N.E. (2d) 362 (1941); note, 19 CHCAGO-KENT LAW

REVIEW 276.
354 Leaving a copy of summons with a maid not employed by defendant, at a
place at which he did not reside, though visited occasionally, was held not enough
to comply with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 137.
355 285 IMl. App. 212, 1 N.E. (2d) 873 (1936); note, 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 369
(1936).
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Motion practice, substituting for the use of the common
law general or special demurrer, has also given rise to some
questions, whether the motion is directed to the complaint or
the subsequent pleadings. The propriety of repeating a motion to dismiss a suit or counterclaim after the same has
once been decided was involved in McGraw v. Oelig 5 and
it was held that no sound objection exists thereto todays5 7
any more than was the case hitherto. 5 8 If an answer has
been filed in the interim between the two motions, leave
should be secured to withdraw the same upon such terms
59
as the court may impose.
In Connett v. Winget3 60 an occasion arose for the Supreme Court of Illinois to apply, for the first time, that
part of Section 42(3) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 61
which deals with the waiver of defects in pleadings if not
objected to in the trial court. There a complaint, based on
negligence, alleged generally that plaintiff was a passenger
with the defendant in the latter's automobile. The defensive
answer relied on the fact that the plaintiff was a guest.
The defendant's failure to question the sufficiency of the
language of the complaint until after verdict was held to be
a waiver of any defect therein, hence the complaint was regarded as sufficient to support a judgment for the
plaintiff.3 62
As used to attack subsequent pleadings, the motion has
seemingly been expanded in scope. In The Department of
Finance v. Schmidt, 6 ' a suit to collect taxes, the defendant
filed a sworn answer setting forth new facts tending to show
that the plaintiff's claim had been previously adjudicated
356 309 Ill. App. 628, 33 N.E. (2d) 758 (1941); note, 19 CHicAco-KENT LAW
REvIEw 373.
857 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 172(4) applies only to a ruling on a motion
under section 48 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act and a subsequent attempt to
raise the same point in a later answer.
358 Shaw v. Dorris, 290 IMl. 196, 124 N.E. 796 (1919).
359 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 170.
360 374 Ill. 531, 30 N.E. (2d) 1 (1940), reversing 303 Ill. App. 227, 25 N.E. (2d) 116
(1940); notes, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw Rmw 189; 30 Ill. B. J. 64, 66.
361 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 166(3).
362 Left undetermined is the problem as to whether the responsibility is on the
plaintiff to allege in his complaint the essential facts showing he was a paying
passenger, or upon defendant to plead and prove that plaintiff was a guest within
the meaning of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 95 , § 58a.
363 374 Ill. 351, 29 N.E. (2d) 530 (1940).
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adversely to plaintiff's contentions. Plaintiff moved to strike
such answer on the ground that the prior proceedings relied
on were not res judicata, inasmuch as the same had been
dismissed without prejudice. Defendant made no objection
that such motion was unverified, and his answer was
stricken. On appeal from the subsequent judgment, defendant
urged as error the granting of the unsworn motion to strike
the verified answer. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
verification of a motion to strike a sworn pleading is required only if such motion sets forth new matter,3 64 but
that defendant's failure to raise such question in the trial
court prevented consideration of the point on appeal. More
interesting, perhaps, is the problem of what decision should
have been rendered had proper objection been made. The
365
motion under Section 45 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act
is in the nature of a common law demurrer. No affidavit
for the latter was necessary under the former practice except by reason of a rule of court requiring an affidavit that
the same was not interposed for purpose of delay. 66 The
verified motion under Section 48 of the Act 367 is available
only for the purpose of dismissing plaintiff's complaint or
defendant's counterclaim. It is not clear by what authority
plaintiff could file a motion to strike defendant's answer
and in support thereof supply new matter to the record. If
the matter in the answer is insufficient to present a defense,
a simple motion to strike should be enough. If plaintiff desires to controvert the defensive material, he should use a
reply pursuant to Section 32 of the Civil Practice Act. 36
Steps Subsequent to the Pleading Stage
The provisions of the act relating to summary judgment
expressly apply to actions "(a) upon a contract, express or
implied; or (b) upon a judgment or decree for the payment
364 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 159, requires verification of subsequent pleadings if an earlier pleading has been so verified. Query: Is a motion to strike a
"pleading?" The common law demurrer was not regarded as such. Puterbaugh,
Common Law Pleading and Practice (10th ed.), p. 91, § 98; nor is its substitute
included in the designation of pleadings covered by section 32 of the fllinois Civil
Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 156.
365 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 169.
366 Rules, Circuit and Superior Courts of Cook County, May 16, 1929. Rule 8
thereof is similar to present Rule 20, adopted December 5, 1937.
367 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 172.
368 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 156.
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of money.
"369 It was held, therefore, in Eagle Indemnity Company v. Haaker 7 ° that proceedings thereunder
were proper even though the foundational claim, upon which
the initial judgment was rendered, was one sounding in tort.
A further sidelight was thrown on summary judgment procedure by a second point therein presented. The plaintiff
failed to file a reply to the defendant's answer containing
new matter but instead moved for summary judgment. The
defendant joined in such motion without questioning the
plaintiff's omission to file a reply. It was held, consequently,
proceeding, the
that, by joining in the summary3 judgment
71
point.
the
waived
had
defendant
The most complete discussion of the summary judgment procedure 372 given so far appears in Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan & Building Association,3 3 in which the
court found that defensive affidavits were wilfully evasive,
failed to state facts necessary to raise a triable issue, and
hence entitled plaintiff to summary judgment. Of interest,
though not decided, were the further questions of the defendant's right in such proceedings to question (a) any variance between the plaintiff's complaint and his summary
judgment affidavits, and (b) the existence of fatal defects
in the plaintiff's complaint by reason of which it failed to
state a cause of action. Neither of these defects was found
to exist in the instant case, but presumably either could be
relied on to defeat the use of summary judgment proceedings, at least until the complaint is amended.
Discretionary control by the court over the litigant's
right to take a non-suit, was sanctioned in O'Brien v. McCarthy,374 which approved a rule of the Municipal Court
369 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 181.
370 309 Ill. App. 406, 33 N.E. (2d) 154 (1941); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvsw 374.
371 Watt v. Cecil, 368 Ill. 510, 15 N.E. (2d) 292 (1938), holds that by joining in
a trial of the issue, the defendant thereby waives the plaintiff's failure to file a
reply. Though not squarely in point, the analogy is sound, since both involve an
inquiry on the facts: in summary judgment proceedings, to ascertain if there is
any "fact" to be determined, and, in a trial, to determine if that "fact" has been
established.
372 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 181.
373 310 Ill. App. 465, 34 N.E. (2d) 736 (1941); note, 30 Ill. B.J. 115.
374 306 Ill. App. 151, 28 N.E. (2d) 334 (1940), Matchett, J., dissenting; note, 19
CHIcAGo-KENT LAW RErIw
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of Chicago then in force,"' on the ground such rules merely
regulate practice and procedure, despite a strong dissent
that the right to take a non-suit is a substantive right and,
consequently, not subject to control by a mere rule of court.
Actions by persons allowed to sue in forma pauperis
may not, hereafter, be settled or dismissed without the payment, to the proper public official, of the costs of such litigation. A lien has now been created for the amount thereof
in favor of such official, binding not only the litigants but
also insurers or other third persons in anywise liable, enforcible by petition in the court in which the suit is pending.3 76 Attorneys contemplating the settlement of litigation
should ascertain the applicability of such statute, since no
notice of the lien is required beyond the mere entry of the
order granting leave to file such suit as a poor person.
Mere passage of time between the verdict and the entry
of judgment is not enough to cause the trial court to lose
jurisdiction of the proceedings. Hence, according to the case
of The Wallace Grain & Supply Company v. Cary,377 an
application for judgment on the verdict over five years after
the return thereof is not open to objection, 7 8 inasmuch as
a cause once docketed is deemed, in law, pending until the
matters in controversy have been finally determined. 7 9
The finality of a judgment order, once entered, has produced some significant decisions. In one case 38 0 the term
of the presiding judge expired shortly after the rendition of
judgment. Within thirty days the unsuccessful litigant moved
to vacate the same. Hearing on such motion was provided
by the successor judge and the requested relief was granted
by him. It was contended that such action was improper
in the absence of statutory authority conferring power on
375 Civil Practice Rules of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 1933, 90; rule 122.
The present rule 46, in force July 1, 1940, follows the text of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
Ch. 110, § 176.
376 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 462; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 33, § 5 and § Ga.
377 374 Ill. 57, 28 N.E. (2d) 107 (1940), reversing 303 Ill. App. 221, 24 N.E. (2d)
907 (1940); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw RrV -'w 115.
378 The court intimated that the objection might have been sustained had there
been a showing of laches causing a change in the rights of the parties or of third
persons.
379 II. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 37, § 72.24.
380 The Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Legg, 374 Ill. 306, 29 N.E.
(2d) 515 (1940).
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the successor judge to vacate the final orders of his predecessor. The court held, however, that the final judgment,
when entered, is the judgment of the court and not that of
the individual judge, and that the court itself, no matter
how constituted, has jurisdiction over its final judgments
for a period of thirty days after rendition, 81 and hence
may, upon good cause shown, vacate the same. On the other
hand, reopening proceedings after final judgment or decree
to permit the addition of new parties does not come within
the provisions of Section 46 of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act,38 2 according to Trupp v. First Englewood State Bank
of Chicago,3 8 3 in which an unsuccessful attempt was made
to add some 1250 additional defendants, shareholders in a
bank stock holding company, and to recover superadded
liability from them, over two years after the original decree
had been rendered. Any attempt to permit such amendment, and thus confer jurisdiction on the court, would be
regarded as an unconstitutional infringement, in the guise
of procedural regulation, of the provisions of the statute
38 4
relating to the finality of judgments and decrees.
Trial court review of its own law judgments, upon proper
grounds, was hitherto accomplished by the proceedings in the
nature of a writ of error coram nobis.8 8 3 Similar review of
proceedings in equity was by means of a bill of review.3 8 6
Neither method was applicable to the other system. Upon
the adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, the former
provision regarding proceedings in the nature of a writ of
error coram nobis was re-enacted." 7 The statute was silent
as to the method for the review of equitable decrees, although
it purported to abolish the formal differences between law
and equity procedure.8 8 Such silence induced the Appellate Court, in Frank v. Newburger,389 to hold that the statu381 IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 174(7).
382 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 170. Clause 1 thereof permits

such action
"before" final judgment. Clause 3, permitting amendment of pleadings even
"after" judgment, says nothing about bringing in new parties.
383 307 Ill. App. 258, 30 N.E. (2d) 198 (1940).
384 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 82-85.
385 Il. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 110, § 89.
386 Ernst Tosetti Brewing Company v. Koehler, 200 Ill. 369, 65 N.E. 636 (1902).
387 i. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 196.
388 11l. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 155.
389

298 Ill. App. 548, 19 N.E. (2d) 147 (1939); note, 17

REvizw 276.
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tory method for review of legal proceedings applied likewise to chancery suits. In no uncertain terms this view was
rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court, 9 ' so that, hereafter, the person seeking judicial re-examination of an earlier decree in equity must use the bill of review.
A person desiring to revive a judgment may have recourse to either the common law proceedings by scire facias 39' or use the newer method provided by Section 55 of
the Illinois Civil Practice Act.3 92 The distinctions between
them and the appropriate procedure to follow must, however, be borne in mind. If the judgment creditor elects to
pursue the former course he must not fail to have the writ
of scire facias issued, according to The First National Bank
of Chicago v. Craig,393 inasmuch as the use of the ordinary
summons in civil actions will not suffice to notify the defendant, even though actually served, of the nature of the
proceedings nor require him to answer the same.
Appeal and Appellate Procedure
Upon substantially the same problem, the second and
third divisions of the Appellate Court, First District, have
arrived at opposite results as to the right of a litigant to
appeal from an order denying a motion to quash the service
of process and directing the defendant to plead to the merits.
In one case9 4 the court, of its own motion,3 95 raised the
point and decided that such order was not a final order under Section 77, nor an appealable interlocutory order under
Section 78, of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 39 and consequently dismissed the appeal. In the other case 397 the problem of the appealability of the order in question appears to
have escaped the attention of the court,3 98 and it decided,
on the facts, that the trial court erred in denying such motion, hence reversed the order. The situation thus created
390 Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 34 N.E. (2d) 424 (1941); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT
LAw REvmw 372.
891 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 24b.
392 IMI.Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 179.
393 308 Ill. App. 377, 31 N.E. (2d) 810 (1941).
394 Thomas v. Ritholz, 310 Ill. App. 166, 33 N.E. (2d) 932 (1941, 3rd div., 1st dist.)
395 The plaintiff-appellee filed no appearance or brief.
396 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, §§ 201, 202.
397 Snyder v. Whitney, 310 IMI. App. 297, 34 N.E. (2d) 95 (1941, 2nd div., 1st dist.)
398 Again the successful plaintiff-appellee fied no appearance or brief.
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is unfortunate, but doubtless the rule is correctly stated in

the Thomas case. 99
While, generally, the right of appeal exists only in cases
of final judgments, order, or decrees, 0 unless otherwise
specifically permitted by statute,4"' it has been held in
Durkin v. Hey 02 that an appeal from an order compelling
the production of books pursuant to the provisions of the
Unemployment Compensation Act"' is proper as the same
is regarded as a final appealable order.404 It was further
held that the fact that the writ of error should more properly be used to review such proceedings 40 5 is not alone
ground for the dismissal of the appeal under the saving
effect of Rule 28 of the Illinois Supreme Court. 6
The provisions of the Illinois Civil Practice Act purporting to give the Appellate Court power to enter judgment
on the verdict if it found the trial court had erroneously
granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 40 7 were declared unconstitutional in Sprague v. Goodrich 4 8 as an attempt to confer original jurisdiction on a

tribunal possessing only appellate jurisdiction. A potential
method by which the same result could be accomplished,
that of having the trial court pass on the two issues presented by the alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, giving the appellate tribunal an opportunity to review both rulings and enter judgment accordingly, was tacitly indicated as the proper method
to pursue. Upon somewhat similar grounds the Illinois Su399 Thomas v. Ritholz, 310 Ill. App. 166, 33 N.E. (2d) 932 (1941, 3rd div., 1st dist.)
400 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 201.
401 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 202, permits such an appeal in cases involving
interlocutory orders relating to injunctions and receiverships. Rule 31 of the
Illinois Supreme Court (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.31) merely supplements
Ch. 110, § 202.
402 376 Ill. 292, 33 N.E. (2d) 463 (1941).
403 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 228.
404 Lester v. Berkowitz, 125 Ill. 307, 17 N.E. 706 (1888), and Illinois Trust &
Savings Bank v. Howard, 185 Ill. 332, 57 N.E. 39 (1900), distinguished as applying
merely to orders to produce documentary evidence in a pending case.
405 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 230.
406 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.28.
407 Ill. Rev. Stat 1941, Ch. 110, § 192(3c).
408 376 Ill. 80, 32 N.E. (2d) 897 (1941), reversing 304 Ill. App. 556, 26 N.E. (2d)
884 (1940); notes, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1391; 29 Ill. B. J. 477; 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
786. Companion case, Walaite v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Coinpany, 376 Ill. 59, 33 N.E. (2d) 119 (1941), reversing 306 Ill. App. 5, 28 N.E. (2d)
149 (1940); notes, 19 CHicAo-KmKN LAw REvizw 275; 29 Il. B. J. 477.
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preme Court, in Schmidt V. The Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, 4 9 held unconstitutional that
portion of Section 92 of the Act 410 which purports to confer
on the reviewing court the power to consider original evidence not offered in the trial court.
The true function of the amicus curiae is to protect the
court in the consideration of a cause by providing such aid
as is necessary or advisable when it appears that the parties
to the litigation are not so doing. The mere fact that a pending cause may vitally affect other litigation or controversies
is not enough to warrant intervention by persons connected
with such other litigation. The Illinois Supreme Court has
now, in a supplemental opinion to Froehler v. The North
American Life Insurance Company of Chicago,41 ' announced
that in the future, before that court, no such application for
leave to file a brief as amicus curiae will be received or
considered if accompanied by a brief, and no such motion,
except in unusual cases, will be allowed unless in such motion it be shown that the parties to the litigation have overlooked or insufficiently briefed points and authorities essential to a proper consideration of the cause.
The time within which a notice of appeal must be filed412
does not begin to run if, within thirty days from the date of
the judgment or order appealed from, a motion to vacate the
same is filed by either party. If and when, even though at
a much later period, the court finally disposes of such motion, the statutory period of limitation on the right to appeal
then first commences running according to Toman v. The
Park Castles Apartment Building Corporation;413 hence, a
motion to dismiss an appeal taken within such extended period should not be granted.
Under the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court 414 the recWhile speaking solely
409 376 Ill. 183, on 197, 33 N.E. (2d) 485, on 492 (1941).
of the power of the Supreme Court to receive such evidence, the reasons propounded for unconstitutionality are fully applicable to the several appellate
courts.
410 fll. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 216(ld).
411 374 Ill.
17 (at p. 27), 27 N.E. (2d) 833 (at p. 838) (1940).
412 IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 200.
413 375 Ill. 293, 31 N.E. (2d) 299 (1941),
reversing 303 Ill. App. 205, 24 N.E.
(2d) 868 (1940), which fails to indicate any decision in that court upon the instant
problem.
414 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.36,

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

ord upon which the appeal is based must be filed in the
trial court within fifty days after the appeal has been perfected, and transmitted to the reviewing court not more
than sixty days after the notice of appeal has been filed.
Such rules further provide that in the event the trial judge
extends the time for filing, then the time within which the
record on appeal shall be transmitted to the reviewing court
is correspondingly extended. 415 Despite such clear language,
an attempt was made in Finn v. Williams4 16 to dismiss an
appeal because the record was filed too late under the first
portion of the rule, though within ample time under the latter portion. The motion was unsuccessful.
The distinction between the "short" and "long" appeal,
under Section 76 (1) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,41 7
must be observed according to Spivey Building Corporation
v. Illinois Iowa Power Company,4 1 and a litigant having
taken recourse to the former may not subsequently seek to
use the latter, even though his former appeal may have
419
been dismissed through reasons beyond his control.
House Bill 531, effective January 1, 1942, contains many
changes relating to civil practice and procedure. Attorneys
not familiar with the provisions thereof should consult the
brief synopsis thereof by Albert E. Jenner, Jr., former chairman of the Illinois Bar Association's section on Civil Practice and Procedure, 420 as well as the language of the current statutes. The principal sections affected or added are
those dealing with summary judgment procedure, the machinery for discovery including pre-trial conference, the time
of making jury demand upon the transfer of a cause from
the equity to the law docket, service of process outside the
county, venue in cases involving quasi-municipal corporations, supplemental proceedings to discover assets, and
many changes with reference to the right of appeal and the
IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.36(2a).
376 Ill. 95, 33 N.E. (2d) 226 (1941).
417 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
418 375 IM. 128, 30 N.E. (2d) 641 (1940); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 274.
419 Under House Bill 531, effective January 1, 1942, applicable to actions thereafter brought and to actions then pending, an attempt has been made to save to
the litigant the remedy of the "long" appeal if his recourse to the "short" appeal
has been defeated without his culpable negligence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110,
§ 200, as amended.
420 30 Ill. B. J. 23.
415
416
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time within which steps relating thereto must be taken.
Changes in the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court will probably become necessary by reason thereof. Until a full statement of the act, with the accompanying rules, is available
further comment thereon is valueless.
EVIDENCE

An appellate court rarely notices error on its own motion and then usually only to prevent obvious injustice. Such
decisions are usually debatable, and the recent case of
4 2 ' is no exception. In this case,
United States v. Dressier,
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on its
own motion noticed error in the admission of evidence to
which no exception had been taken. The inadmissable evidence consisted of "criminal history" of the accused on the
back of a card bearing the finger prints of the accused which
was properly introduced into evidence and given to the jury
for the purpose of comparing them with other finger prints.
Due to an oversight, this error was not urged upon the court
until the motion for a new trial was argued. The Court of
Appeals considered the error sufficiently prejudicial to the
defendant to reverse the judgment.
Judge Evans dissented for the reasons that, (a) the trial
was fair and the failure to discover the character of the
evidence submitted, bound the defendant, (b) there was no
certainty that the jury considered anything but the proffered
part of the card exhibit, (c) the jury could not have been
prejudiced even had they read the inadmissable "criminal
history" on the back of the exhibit, and, finally, that (d) an
appellate court should not lightly contravene the exercised
discretion of the trial judge who saw and heard the evidence and who refused to grant a new trial.
It will be generally agreed that opportunity must be given to cross-examine a witness who has testified on direct
examination or that his testimony should be stricken out.
An exception is made in some jurisdictions where severe
illness or death intervenes. This question was presented in
Illinois for the first time in the case of Kubin v. Chicago
421

112 F. (2d) 972 (1940).
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Title & Trust Company,"' in which a suggestion rather than
a decision appears in the opinion to the effect that the trial
judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, under the above
mentioned circumstances, admit the direct testimony, insofar as the loss of cross-examination can be shown by the
direct examiner to be immaterial.
EQUITY

The work of defining the relationship between equity and
law under the Civil Practice Act of 1933 proceeds steadily if
slowly. This year both legislature and courts have made
contributions. The controversy involved in the much-discussed case of Frank v. Newburger 423 has finally reappeared
in the Supreme Court as Frank v. Salomon.1 4 It is now
finally decided that Section 72425 of the Civil Practice Act,
substituting motions for writs of error coram nobis, is not
applicable to chancery proceedings. Mr. Justice Smith points
out that the Civil Practice Act preserves the distinction between actions at law and in equity:
These provisions demonstrate it was not the legislative intent to abolish
substantive distinctions. Considering together all the provisions quoted,
it was the obvious intention to do away with forms of pleading but to
preserve separate procedure in law and equity. . . . Presumably the
legislature knew that the constitutional requirement of trial by jury in
actions at law necessitates a distinction between legal and equitable
proceedings, and we may assume that fact was taken into consideration
426
when the statute was enacted.

The conclusion that "actions at law" and "actions in equity"
remain in Illinois 42 7 is further reinforced by the amendment
to Section 64 of the Civil Practice Act 428 which will become
effective January 1, 1942. This amendment is intended to
Since the court quotes from Wig422 307 IlL App. 12, 29 N.E. (2d) 859 (1940).
more on Evidence (3rd ed.), V, § 1390, and since this reference does not distinguish chancery cases from cases in law with respect to this rule, it is possible
that the Kubin case which was an equitable action will be followed in later cases
sounding in law. It should be noted that the Kubin case was actually decided on
other grounds so that the holding herein discussed was dictum.
428 298 IML App. 548, 19 N.E. (2d) 147 (1939).
424 376 Ill. 439, 34 N.E. (2d) 424 (1941); note, 19 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 372.
425 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 196.
426 376 Ill. at p. 444, 34 N.E. (2d) at p. 426.
427 See discussion by R. L. Severns, "Equity and 'Fusion' in Illinois," 18
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 333, pp. 359-370.
428

Laws of Ill. 1941, Vol. 1, p. 466.
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clarify the problem of jury trial under the act. Plaintiff,
desiring a jury trial, is required to file a demand at the
time suit is commenced, and defendant is required to file
his demand at the time of filing his appearance. In the event
a case is transferred in whole or in part from the equity docket to the law docket a plaintiff is given three days and a
defendant is given six within which to file a jury demand.
Although the act has been severely criticized for retaining the distinction referred to, it is apparent that a more
harmonious partnership between equity and law has been
accomplished. A recent case before the Appellate Court42 9
began as a suit for specific performance. The chancellor
ruled that there was no equitable ground for specific performance but retained the case and assessed damages as
in a law action. The Appellate Court held this to be proper
procedure under the Civil Practice Act and ruled that a
jury had been waived by failure to demand it. Apparently in
such a case it is discretionary with the trial court to retain the case. Mr. Justice Matchett remarked, "It would
be useless to send the case back to the trial court to have
the chancellor enter an order that he should hear it through
' 430
his legal instead of his equitable ear.
Two other cases involved procedural questions which
should be noticed. The Appellate Court considered the propriety of an injunction order granted without either notice
43
or bond under provisions of the Illinois injunction statute. '
It was held that allegations in the complaint that notice to
defendant would unduly and prejudicially delay the hearing
were insufficient to justify such an injunction restraining
the breach of a contract to purchase dairy products exclusively from the plaintiff.4 3 2 Such allegations did not touch
the merits of plaintiff's case. The Appellate Court also discussed generally and at length in another case the circum433
stances under which interpleader will lie.
The confidential relationship concept received an inter429
430
431
432
433

(1940).

Westerfield v. Redmer, 310 Ill. App. 246, 33 N.E. (2d) 744 (1941).
310 Ill.
App. at p. 250, 33 N.E. (2d) at p. 746.
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 69, §§ 3 and 9.
Wagner v. Okner, 306 Ill.App. 601, 29 N.E. (2d) 385 (1940).
City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dunham, 306 Ill.
App. 354, 28 N.E. (2d) 812
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4 34
esting application in Pidot v. Zenith Radio Corporation.
Here it was held that a confidential relationship arose when
a designer of radio cabinets submitted sketches to officials
of a radio manufacturer with a view to having them adopted
by the manufacturer. In the action, wrongful appropriation
of plaintiff's designs was charged and it was said that the
burden of establishing that the designs were originated independently was upon the defendant. The decree of the
lower court dismissing the complaint was affirmed. Another opinion of the Appellate Court 435 contains a significant
discussion of the ownership of literary property as between
employer and employee. There are indications that the courts
will devise some more satisfactory means of protecting ideas
than now exist apart from the patent and copyright laws.
The "clean hands" maxim was applied in People v. Depositors State Bank.43 8 In Hayes v. Davis4 37 the Appellate
Court followed the familiar rule in equity that where the
owner of land on which permanent improvements have been
placed by mistake seeks relief in equity he must be willing
to allow the mistaken defendant compensation to the extent
that the improvements have enhanced the value of the property.
As was reported in the Survey last year43 8 the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the Supreme Court of
Illinois in the case of Hansberry v. Lee.439 It was held that
the doctrine of res judicata could not be constitutionally
applied to class suits where there was no adequate representation of substantial interests involved. The case has received extensive treatment in the law reviews.440
CONFLICT OF LAWS

Two important decisions involving conflict of laws problems in the field of workmen's compensation were handed
down by Illinois courts this year. The opinion of the Supreme
308 Ill. App. 197, 31 N.E. (2d) 385 (1941).
Phillips v. WGN, Inc., 307 Ill. App. 1, 29 N.E. (2d) 849 (1940).
436 306 Ill.
App. 365, 28 N.E. (2d) 825 (1940).
437 307 Ill. App. 440, 30 N.E. (2d) 521 (1940).
438 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw RELvw, pp. 69-71.
439 311 U. S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 11 (1940).
440 26 Corn. L. Q. 317; 39 Mich. L. Rev. 829; 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 525. The
decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois was commented on in 35 Ill. L. Rev.
213 and 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 563.
434
435
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Court in Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Service44 1 dealt with the
considerations of policy involved in the recognition and application of provisions of the compensation law of another
state. Biddy, a resident of Michigan, was employed as a
camera man by a Michigan corporation having a studio in
Chicago but its principal place of business in Detroit. Biddy
was killed in the crash, near Naperville, Illinois, of a plane
belonging to Blue Bird Air Service chartered to take Biddy
on an assignment. The contract of employment had been
entered into in Michigan and both employer and employee
had elected to be bound by the compensation law of that
state. An award for dependents under the provisions of the
Michigan statute had been paid by the employer's insurance carrier. The administratrix brought suit in Illinois
under the Injuries Act44 2 of this state. The defendants contended that the suit could not be maintained, first, because
the compensation law of Illinois applied, and, second, because under the law of Michigan if the employee or his dependents elected to take compensation any right of action
against a negligent third person passed to the employer.
The Supreme Court disposed summarily of the first
contention, pointing out that the contract of employment was
made in Michigan and citing Cole v. Industrial Commission"' as authority for the proposition that the Illinois act
did not apply to the situation. But, relying partly on the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brad4 44 the court held
ford Electric Light Company v. Clapper,
that it should recognize and enforce the provisions of the
Michigan statute which made election to take compensation
a bar to a suit against a third person whose negligence
caused the death. In response to a contention that the
provision of the Michigan act which permits such an election by the employee was contrary to public policy in Illinois,
the court pointed out that the right of election was not involved and that plaintiff was in the same position as though
compensation had been paid under the Illinois act. Since
plaintiff would not be entitled to maintain this action under
441
442
443
444

374
Ill.
353
286

Ill. 506, 30 N.E. (2d) 14 (1940).
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 70, §§ 1 et seq.
Ill.
415, 187 N.E. 520 (1933).
U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026 (1932).
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the Illinois act, the giving effect to the provisions of the
Michigan act was in accord with public policy in Illinois.
A related problem came before the Appellate Court in
Miller v. Yellow Cab Company.4 4 5 In this case the principal
question was whether or not the provisions of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act apply to an employee injured
while temporarily in Illinois where the contract of employment was made outside of the state and the principal employment was also outside of the state. The court refused to
apply the Illinois act to a suit by the employee against a
third person allegedly negligent, where the contract of employment was made and the employment carried on in Texas.
Reliance was placed here also principally on the case of
Cole v. Industrial Commission"6 and upon Bradford Elec477 Public policy was held
tric Light Company v. Clapper.
not to forbid an action by an employee against a negligent
third person where such action is permitted under the applicable compensation law of another state. 448 Thus, in
these two cases, the courts in Illinois have held that where
the Illinois compensation act does not apply it is not contrary to public policy here to permit or to deny an action
by the employee or his representative against a negligent
third person according to the provisions of the applicable
compensation act of another state. The results are justified,
since in ordinary cases no harmful consequences arise from
either course.
The Supreme Court has apparently disapproved of the
position taken in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws that
only the state of the domicile can exercise jurisdiction to
determine the custody of children or to create the status of
guardian of the person.44 In the case of People v. Wingate,"' a father, residing temporarily in Georgia, placed
his infant daughter, after her mother's death, in the custody
of a maternal uncle and aunt in Illinois. Upon the death
445 308 Ill. App. 217, 31 N.E. (2d) 406 (1941); notes, 19 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REWEW 397; 30 Ill. B. J. 110.
446 353 Ill. 415, 187 N.E. 520 (1933).
447 286 U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026 (1932).
448 A valuable treatment of the decision is to be found in a note by L. B.
Marshall in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 397.
449 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 117.
450 376 Ill. 244, 33 N. E. (2d) 467 (1941).
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of the father the child's paternal grandmother, domiciled in
Massachusetts, petitioned a probate court in that state for an
order appointing her as guardian of the person and property
of her granddaughter. The prayer of the petition was granted. Thereafter the grandmother sought a writ of habeas
corpus in Illinois, claiming that she was entitled to custody
of the child by force of her appointment as guardian by the
Massachusetts court. No question was raised as to the
moral fitness of any of the parties or as to the care which
the child had received from the defendants. The circuit
court remanded the child to the custody of the defendants,
and an appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court on
the issue of whether the Illinois court was obliged to extend
full faith and credit to the order of the Massachusetts probate court.
The Supreme Court held that the father was domiciled
in Massachusetts, the domicile of the child was that of its
father, and that the act of the father in placing the child
in the care of the defendants in Illinois did not affect that
domicile. However, the court decided that "the jurisdiction
of a State to regulate the custody of infants found within
its territory does not depend upon the domicile of the child."
Residence within the state was said to be sufficient to confer jurisdiction to determine custody. Since the primary
consideration in all such custody cases is "the present and
prospective welfare of the child," full faith and credit was
said not to require the Illinois court to consider the Massachusetts order a bar to the exercise by the court of the power
to determine the status of the child. The position was taken
that the courts of the state in which the child resides are
in better position to determine what is for its best interests
than are the courts in the state of its domicile. In view of
a tendency to overrefine the law of domicile and to lose
sight of its function and purpose the decision seems to reflect sound common sense. To deny jurisdiction to the Illinois courts under facts like those in the present case, as the
restatement seems to do on the basis of a technical domi451
cile elsewhere, is scarcely realistic.
451 Of course the Restatement recognizes the power of a state in which the
child is found to make a temporary order for its protection (Section 118), and
such state may award control while in the state to another person upon a finding
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The importance of domicile in relation to the validity
of a marriage was considered by the Appellate Court in
4 5 2 In this case a ceremonial marIn re Peirce's Estate.
riage was contracted in Mexico before a previous marriage
of the husband had been dissolved. After the ceremony the
parties established their domicile in Illinois. One child had
been born of the first and four were born of the second marriage. The husband began divorce proceedings in Nevada
some years later against his first wife, who appeared, contested, and won a decree of divorce and alimony from him.
The second wife joined the husband in Nevada after the divorce and remained there three or four weeks with him.
Thereafter, the parties returned to Illinois where they lived
together for many years as husband and wife. Upon the
death of the husband a contest arose over the right to administer the estate. An attempt was made to invoke the
Nevada rule to the effect that if parties attempt a valid
marriage but one is under a disability, cohabitation, after
the removal of the disability, matrimonially intended, will
give rise to a valid marriage. They interpreted the Nevada
law to apply only to Nevada citizens and held that the parties were domiciled in Illinois. Illinois had therefore the
right to determine their status. Recognizing the hardships
involved in the decision holding the second marriage invalid the court said:
Sentiment and companionship go far in the sum of human lives. It is
with sympathy, patience, and understanding that we view the disappointments and sorrows of life. They teach many things not found in
books. However, an affirmance of this case, in our opinion, would violate
453
the intent and purpose of the statute of this state.

The Illinois domicile, here held to require the application of the policy of this state regarding common law marriages, was no mere technical domicile.
One other case of interest involving the enforcement of
foreign judgments should be mentioned. An action on a
Canadian judgment was held to be a "civil action" within
that the domiciliary guardian is an unfit person (Section 148). But apparently
such orders, unless made by the state of the domicile, do not affect the "status"
of the child. See Section 147, comment a and Section 148, comment a.
452 310 Ill. App. 481, 34 N.E. (2d) 564 (1941).
453 310 Ill. App. at p. 486, 34 N.E. (2d) at p. 566.
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the meaning of the provision of Section 15 of the Limitations
Act45 4 requiring "all civil actions not otherwise provided
for" to be brought within five years after the cause of action
accrued. Disapproving of two prior decisions, the Appellate
Court held that an oral promise to pay by the judgment
debtor within the five-year period was sufficient to lift the
bar of the statute.4 55
CREDITORS' RIGHTS

In Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank,45 6 the
Supreme Court has extended to an apparently new type of
situation its rather strict rule concerning bank stockholders
liability. One of the stockholders had transferred his shares
to the bank "for reissue" and a new certificate was issued
to the stockholder and his wife as "joint tenants." The
court held that the transfer started a new period of stock
ownership, and sustained the imposition of separate liability
upon the husband, and upon the husband and wife jointly.
The opinion contains an interesting and informative, if not
too novel, discussion of a number of other points touching
bank stockholders liability-particularly with respect to accounting and evidentiary matters.
A similarly strict attitude is taken with respect to a
different phase of bank stockholders' liability by the Appel457
late Court in Burket v. Reliance Bank & Trust Company.
Three years after judgment had been taken against the defendant upon his liability, he petitioned the court to enjoin
the collection of the judgment on the ground that the total
amount paid in by stockholders holding stock between 1917
and 1928, including payments made subsequent to the judgment against him, exceeded the amount of the bank's unsatisfied liability for that period, and that the period during
which he had held stock was included within those years.5 8
The court denied the petition on two grounds, first, that
there was no allegation or proof that the payments for which
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 83, § 16.
455 Truscon Steel Co. of Canada, Limited v. Biegler, 306 Ill.App. 180, 28 N.E.
(2d) 623 (1940).
456 376 Ill. 413, 34 N.E. (2d) 414 (1914).
457 306 Ill.
App. 563, 29 N.E. (2d) 297 (1940); note, 29 111. B. J. 307.
458 Defendant had held his stock in the bank during the period from March 3,
1921, to July 2, 1924.
454
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credits were claimed were made by contemporaneous stockholders, and, second, that payments made by contemporaneous stockholders could be relied upon only as a defense
to the suit against the stockholder and not by way of satisfaction subsequent to judgment.
In Peiffer v. French,4 5 the Supreme Court has handed
down what would seem to be the last of a series of cases
on body executions, and has apparently been carried away
by its own dictum in Ingalls v. Raklios.10 ° In order to support a body execution the statute requires that "it shall
appear from a special finding of the jury, or from a special
finding by the court, if the case is tried by the court without a jury, that malice is the gist of the action." ''
The statute seems unambiguous and clear, and not to
require such a finding in the judgment when the case has
been tried to a jury and a suitable finding is made by the
jury. In the instant case, nevertheless, the Supreme Court
requires such finding to be included in the judgment in addition to the finding by the jury. The court based the requirement upon its decision in the Raklios case in which it held
that the finding must be included in the judgment itself. In
that case, however, there was no jury, and the true basis of
the decision was that there was no finding at all such as
required by the statute. The Raklios case gave effect to the
purpose of the amendment of the statute, i.e., to have the
question of malice finally determined at the time of the
trial.4 6 2 The Peiffer case goes beyond this and, as indicated
by Mr. Justice Farthing in his dissent, adds to the statute, in
effect, the following:
459 376 il. 376, 33 N.E. (2d) 591 (1941).
460 373 Ill.404, 26 N.E. (2d) 468 (1940). See discussion, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RsvIaw 75.
461 11.Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 5.
462 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 77, § 5: "No execution shall issue against
the body of the defendant, except when the judgment shall have been obtained
for a tort committed by such defendant, or unless the defendant shall have been
held to bail upon a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum [respondendum] as provide4
by law, or he shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his creditors."
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 5: "No execution shall issue against the body of
the defendant except when the judgment shall have been obtained for a tort
committed by such defendant, and it shall appear from a special finding of the
jury, or from a special finding by the court, if the case is tried by the court
without a jury, that malice is the gist of the action, and except when the
defendant shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his creditors.
[As amended by act approved July 11, 1935. Laws 1935, p. 937.]"
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And this same finding that malice is the gist of the action must be included in the judgment in the former case [where there is a jury trial]
as well as in the latter [where there is no jury].

It may be well to mention two Appellate Court cases
passing upon points of some interest if of no great difficulty.
4 6 3 the court invalidated a garnishment
In Ring v. Palmer,
proceeding commenced within seven years of the rendition
of the judgment, but in which the writ was not served until
after the expiration of that period. The court does not indicate whether the result would have been the same had
the writ been served before the judgment lapsed. It does,
however, seem to feel that the same rule applies to garnishments as to executions. If so, it might be that a remedy
analagous to that of venditioni exponas, which permits sale
under an execution even after the expiration of the normal
judgment period. 64 In the second case, that of Brown v.
Nelson,46 5 the Appellate Court held that failure to have homestead set off does not invalidate an execution sale, although
it does not, of course, defeat the right to have such homestead
set off.
DAMAGES

The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District
took an important step in approving an action brought to
recover attorney's fees incurred in previous litigation between the same parties.46 6 This appears to be the first time
in Illinois that an appellate court has recognized this right.
Previous cases merely recognized a common law right to
recover such fees incurred in an action between the plaintiff
and a third person where the litigation had been occasioned
by the defendant's wrong. The prior litigation here involved
was a suit in equity, brought by the heirs of one who had
been defrauded of his interest in land by the defendant, to
reclaim that interest. The present decision is new not only in
309 Ill. App. 333, 32 N.E. (2d) 956 (1941).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 6: "No execution shall issue upon any judgment
after the expiration of seven years from the time the same becomes a lien, except
upon the revival of the same by scire facias; but real estate, levied upon within
said seven years may be sold upon a venditio rei [venditioni] exponas, at any
time within one year after the expiration of said seven years."
465 309 Ill. App. 557, 33 N.E. (2d) 648 (1941).
466 Ritter v. Ritter, 308 Ill. App. 337, 32 N.E. (2d) 185 (1941); notes, 8 U. of Ci.
L. Rev. 760, 30 Ill.B. J. 69.
463
464
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recognizing the right to such fees but also in approving the
subsequent action brought solely for the purpose of recovering those fees. One judge dissented on the grounds, first,
that this decision was opposed to the policy of the law in
this state and, second, that the matter was res judicata
because the matter might have been raised in the equity
suit. The latter point is not well taken, however, because
the doctrine of res judicata applies to matters which might
have been raised in the previous suit only if they could
have been raised in support or defense of the cause of action
there litigated, and it does not apply to such matters as
might properly have been joined as a demand or used as a
counterclaim. As to the matter of policy, it remains for the
Supreme Court to decide whether it will so interpret its previous declarations.
GOVERNMENT
TAXATION

Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company v. State Tax Commission 67 presents the most perplexing tax problem of the
year. The Tax Commission, pursuant to the statutory mandate to tax railroad property as a unit,468 fixed the full value
of the property, divided such value among the counties and
other taxing districts through which the line of railroad
operated, and then equalized the values so allocated for each
county at the average level of assessment in force in the
particular county. The Supreme Court invalidated the assessment upon the ground that, despite the fact that no statewide property taxes were levied, the state is a taxing district for the purpose of taxing railroad property, and that
such property must be assessed "as a unit and upon no
higher valuation for one mile than another." The method
employed by the Tax Commission prior to 1938 had been to
equalize as a unit the full valuation of the property, using
as an equalizing factor the average level of assessment
throughout the state. The change of method was doubtless
prompted by a realization that the former method gave an
unfair advantage to counties using a low level of assessment
and worked an undue hardship upon counties using a rela467 374 Il. 75, 28 N.E. (2d) 100 (1940); note, 35 IRI. L. Rev. 766.
468 IRl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 561.
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tively higher level. It would seem that the former practice
departs further from the ideal of uniformity envisioned by
the court4 6 than does the method employed in the instant
case. For the years 1933 through 1937 the average level of
assessment used was 37 per cent, whereas immediately adjacent property in one county was assessed at a level as
low as 24 per cent and in another county as high as 78 per
cent. The Tax Commission now seems confronted with two
alternatives: (1) to revert to the former inequitable practice, or (2) to undertake the burden and expense of equalizing the assessment levels throughout the state. The mere
clerical expense in connection with the latter alternative
would be staggering, and otherwise quite unnecessary since
no state property tax is now levied. It is submitted that the
method invalidated by the court has precisely the same effect
such an equalization would have, and without the burden and
expense thereof. It is regrettable that this intelligent innovation in the direction of true uniformity of assessment has
run ashoal on the rocks of a highly artificial concept of uniformity.4 7 °
The case of French v. Toman4 71 raises several questions involving Illinois taxation and gives only a partial answer to one of them. After tax foreclosure proceedings, a
redemption was made by the plaintiff, who had acquired
title subsequent to the period for which the taxes foreclosed
had accrued. The state's attorney, for some reason which
does not appear, instead of permitting the customary suit472
to enjoin the collection of the balance of the tax to go by
default, contested it. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff held the property free of liability for the balance of the
taxes and that the injunction should be issued. The decision
469 "The enforcement of the uniformity requirements of the constitution is not
a new problem in this court nor with the legislature, and it cannot truthfully be
said that either branch of government has ever yet arrived at a satisfactory
solution. It may be that the ideal is beyond attainment through available human
agencies, yet the quest cannot be abandoned either by the legislative or judicial
branch of government. The problem is administrative rather than legislative or
judicial, and the administrative difficulties have so far proved insurmountable in
so far as any exact attainment of the desired end is concerned."
470 For an excellent discussion of the opinion, see note, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 766.
471 375 Ill. 389, 31 N.E. (2d) 801 (1941); note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RsvIvW 310.
472 See discussion of Brown v. Jacobs, 367 Ill. 545, 12 N.E. (2d) 1210 (1937), in
17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 64. This same technique has been applied to
foreclosures.
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was not as broad, however, as it was originally hoped by
the bar that it might be. The court deliberately refrained
from determining whether or not there is personal liability
for the payment of real property taxes. The court stressed
the fact that the plaintiff had acquired title after the taxes
became a lien, and reached its decision by application of
ordinary principles governing redemption from foreclosure
of liens. It seems clear that the decision furnishes no basis
for dispensing with the independent injunction suit now in
use in tax foreclosure.47 3
During the period of the survey the Supreme Court has
handed down three decisions affecting substantive liability
to pay occupational sales tax, the tenor of which is quite
different from that of previous decisions, and in all three of
which the rules of the Department of Finance were sustained.
In Ahern v. Nudelman, 74 the rule4 75 had required the payment of tax by undertakers upon caskets, grave vaults,
graveclothing and flowers, but not upon receipts from services. The unsuccessful taxpayer had sought to bring sales
to the taxable articles within the sweeping doctrine of the
40
Babcock,476 Adair ,477 Burgess,4 7 Mallen 479 and Marshall
cases, holding not taxable the transfer of tangible property
incidental to the rendition of professional or skilled services.
In Sluis v. Nudelman,481 the rule48 2 required the payment of
473 For an excellent discussion of the whole
19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REviEsw 310.
474 374 IU. 237, 29 N.E. (2d) 268 (1940).
475 Department of Finance Rule No. 8: "A

problem, see note by M. Eulette,

funeral director or undertaker is
engaged in the business of selling taxable personal property to consumers, including such articles as caskets, grave vaults and occasionally graveclothing and
flowers.

He is also engaged in the business of rendering services such as em-

balming and providing livery service and other equipment in the conducting of
funerals. A funeral director is liable for tax measured only by the gross receipts
from sales of tangible personal property. No tax applies on receipts from services
which he renders such as those which are enumerated above."
476 Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 Ill. 626, 12 N.E. (2d) 635 (1937); note, 32 Ill. L.

Rev. 685.
477 Adair Printing Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 342, 4 N.E. (2d) 481 (1936).
478 Burgess Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill.
427, 194 N.E. 565 (1935).
479 P. H. Mallen Co. v. Department of Finance, 372 Ill. 598, 25 N.E. (2d) 43,
(1940). Note, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 80.
480 C. & E. Marshall Co. v. Ames, 373 Ill. 381, 26 N.E. (2d) 483 (1940); note, 19
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 80.
481 376 Ill.
457, 34 N.E. (2d) 391 (1941).
482 Department of Finance Rule No. 60: "Sale of seeds to a person who

plants them in the soil for the purpose of growing agricultural products are sales
to a purchaser for use or consumption and not a sale for the purpose of resale.
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tax upon sales of seed to farmers. The contention of discrimination based upon the more favorable treatment
accorded feed dealers, was rejected rather curtly with the
comment that the rule there involved "is entirely separate
and is not in issue in this case."
Continental Can Co. v. Nudelman"I presents an unusually interesting problem of "incidental" sales. The dozen taxpayers here involved were corporations engaged in
manufacturing and processing personal property, none of
which they sold at retail. The tax liability which they unsuccessfully resisted was for receipts from the sale of food
to their employees in cafeterias operated without profit
and merely for convenience. Citing and relying upon the
Franklin County Coal case, 484 the Supreme Court distinguished the exemption arising in the case of "isolated or
occasional sales made by one who does not hold himself
out as engaging in the business of selling such property
at retail. .. "
One sales tax case not touching substantive liability may
4 8 5 the
be mentioned. In Hoffman v. Department of Finance,
Supreme Court reiterated the questionable doctrine of People
v. Fisher,48 6 to the effect that on review of orders of the
department on certiorari the trial court is limited to the
common law relief of quashing the record or quashing the
writ.4 87 The court also held inadmissible in evidence for the
purpose of showing sales in interstate commerce
ninety-four statements and letters purporting to have been signed by
as many individuals which, in effect, stated each of these persons lived
outside the State of Illinois, that they purchased certain merchandise
on a day named, from appellees, and that these goods were delivered
to them at their places of residence.

The court characterized the letters as hearsay and cited the
Novicki case. 48 It may be queried, however, whether the
Seeds are deemed to be used or consumed in the process of producing other
products, and sellers thereof for this purpose become liable for retailers' occupation tax."
483 376 Ill.
446, 34 N.E. (2d) 397 (1941).
484 Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill.
178, 194 N.E. 268 (1935).
485 374 Ill.
494, 30 N.E. (2d) 24 (1940).
486 373 Ill.
228, 25 N.E. (2d) 785 (1940).
487 See discussion in connection with infra, under Public Utilities.
488 Novicki v. Department of Finance, 373 Il. 342, 26 N.E. (2d) 130 (1940);
note, 19 CHIcAGo-KKMT LAw REVmw 81.
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admissibility of such documents does not fall within the
proposition that the department shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence," 9 and if not, just what does fall
within that provision.
In re Globe Varnish Company"O involves the problem
of sales taxes and interstate commerce. The merchandise
in question was sold and delivered to an interstate carrier
in Chicago consigned to the carrier's shops in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Treating the railroad as occupying the dual capacity of purchaser and carrier, the court held the transaction not subject to Illinois retailers' occupational tax on the
ground that such a tax would constitute an interference with
interstate commerce. The court emphasized the fact that
this type of transaction had been used by the seller and the
491
carrier for twenty-five years.
TRADE REGULATION

Two cases, one amended and two new statutes deserve
attention in this field. E. Edelman & Company v. Stromberg492 raises the question of whether or not good will may
be sold with the physical assets of a corporation in a bankruptcy sale. The court quite properly held that it may and
restrained the defendant from unfair competition in his
use of advertisements and names similar to those used
by the defunct corporation. 93
In Phillips v. W.G.N., Inc.," 4 the plaintiff's suit to restrain defendants from broadcasting a program known as
"Painted Dreams" was dismissed because of a finding that
when plaintiff had originally written the program for defendants she had done so under such circumstances that
all "ownership in the result of what was done belonged to
489 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 475: "In the conduct of any investigation or
hearing, neither the Department nor any officer or employee thereof shall be
bound by the technical rules of evidence.... ." The court does not appear to
limit the benefit of this provision to the department, which might offer a solution
here.
490 114 F. (2d) 916 (1940). Cert. den., 312 U. S. 690, 61 S. Ct. 621, 85 L. Ed.
554 (1941).
491 For an excellent analysis of the decision, see 35 Ill.
L. Rev. 972.
492 306 111. App. 118, 28 N.E. (2d) 128 (1940).
493 The alternative would seem to be to hold that the good will is extinguished
since it is recognized that it cannot pass except with the physical assets.
494 307 Ill.
App. 1, 29 N.E. (2d) 849 (1940).
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defendants." Plaintiff had claimed ownership and rested
her case on her common law rights, charging defendants
with unfair competition.4 95
The Illinois Fair Trade Act4 98 permitting resale price
maintenance contracts within the exceptions which the Miller-Tydings Act 4 9 7 carves out of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act4 98 was amended by the 1941 legislature 499 to except
from the provisions of the Act "any commodity for library
purposes" which may be sold or offered for sale to the
State or any political subdivision thereof or to any public,
endowed or school library."0
Two acts 50 ' were passed by the 1941 Legislature, both
of which related to "uneconomic practices" in the sales of
merchandise. The first is directed toward private business
and, with certain exceptions, forbids the sale by any person, firm or corporation to his or its employees, or any person, of any article of merchandise "not of his or its own
production or not handled in his or its regular course of
trade, excepting meals, cigarettes and tobacco, and excepting such specialized appliances and paraphernalia as may
be required in said business enterprise for the safety or
health of its employees.

50

2

The second is directed toward

the State or any political subdivision thereof and its officers, agents and employees. With certain exceptions the
Act forbids each of them
to sell to or procure for sale or have in its or his possession or under its
or his control for sale to any officer, agent or employee of the State
or any political subdivision thereof or municipality therein any article,
material, product or merchandise of whatsoever nature, excepting meals,
public services and such specialized appliances and paraphernalia as
may be required for the safety or health of such officers, agents or
employees .503
495 The case is referred to not because of any novelty in legal conclusions, but
because, strangely enough, it apparently presents a problem of first impression
in our state courts.
496 IMI.Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121
, §§ 188-191.
497 Public Act No. 314, 75th Congress.
498
499

15 U.S.C.A. 1.
§ 190 was added.

500 The effect of the amendment is, of course, to render invalid resale price
maintenance contracts on such commodities.
501 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121 , §§ 204, 205; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121 , §§ 206,
207.
502 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121 , § 204.
503 IMI.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121 , § 206.
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Criminal penalties are imposed for violation of each
act." 4 Plainly the object is to prevent the unlimited wholesale buying through the offices of a business or a political
agency, which is now so common. While the object in each
case may be praiseworthy, serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the former act are raised by reason of the
indefiniteness with which it is drawn and the possible logical
extension of its application to cover sales not conceivably
within the power of the State to prohibit.
PUBLIC UTILITIES

In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin, Joliet
& Eastern Railway Company,5° the Illinois Supreme Court
has gone perhaps further than before in clarifying the scope
of review of orders of the Commerce Commission by the
Circuit Court. Apparently the Circuit Court may not in any
way modify the order of the Commission, even to the extent of reversing in part and affirming in part, but must
either confirm the order or set it aside. The analogy of the
quashing of the record or of the writ under common law
certiorari is obvious. The statute would seem susceptible of
an interpretation permitting modification of the Commission's orders without simply quashing them entirely. 0 The
desirability of the present interpretation may be seriously
questioned. A similar attitude was taken with respect to review of orders of the Department of Finance,5 7 with the
result that the Circuit Court is frequently compelled to invalidate large assessments by the Department simply because some small part of it may not be supported by evidence or otherwise invalidated. There was perhaps more
justification for doing so there than with respect to orders
of the Commerce Commission, inasmuch as the statute provides for review of decisions of the Department of Finance
by "certiorari." ' 50 8
504

IlL Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 121

, §§ 205, 207.

505 374 Ill.
60, 28 N.E. (2d) 97 (1940).

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 111%, § 72.
People v. Fisher, 373 Il. 228, 25 N.E. (2d) 785 (1940).
508 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 451: "The Circuit and Superior Court of the
County wherein the hearing is held shall have power by writ of certiorari to the
Department to review all questions of law and fact determined by the Department in administering the provisions of this Act presented by such record."
506
507
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It might be appropriate to mention at this point another decision involving review, that of Toledo, Peoria &
Western Railroad v. Illinois Commerce Commission, °9 in
which the Supreme Court held that appeals from a judgment reviewing orders of the commission must be taken
within the sixty days specified in the Public Utilities Act5 1
and not simply within the ninety days prescribed in the
Civil Practice Act,5 1' inasmuch as they are within the "spe512
cial statute" exceptions of the latter act.
In Barry v. Commonwealth Edison Company,5 1 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Court
by that same name,5 14 but has apparently left standing,
and perhaps even strengthened what was said therein concerning estoppel by order of the Commerce Commission
operating by analogy, at least, to the doctrine of res judicata. It seems that the defendant had disconnected the plaintiff's electric service on the ground that he was procuring
unmetered current for his tavern by use of a "jumper" on
his electric meter. Service was restored only upon the payment in part and agreement to pay the balance of $800 for
such current. The plaintiff then filed a complaint before the
Illinois Commerce Commission, attempting to recover the
money paid and other relief. Upon dismissal of the complaint, he filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Cook
County in three counts to recover: (1) for the sums paid,
(2) for damage to his business, and (3) for slander. The
Appellate Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the plaintiff was precluded by the Commission's dismissal. In reversing this decision, the Supreme
Court did so upon the ground that the matters in dispute
had not been determined by the Commission, indicating that
the Commission had no jurisdiction to award damages for
injury to the plaintiff's business [as distinguished from reparations for the overcharge, if any] and, of course, no jurisdiction of the slander suit. It would seem clear that the
509 375 IMI.35, 31 N.E. (2d) 293 (1940).
510 fll. Rev. Stat. 1941, Chn. 111%, § 73.
511 III. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 200.
512 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,. Ch. 110, § 125.
513 374 Ill. 473, 29 N.E. (2d) 1014 (1940).
514 302 1ll. App. 558, 24 N.E. (2d) 220 (1939);

RzvxEw 86.

note,
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lower court went too far in dismissing the slander suit. Is
it equally clear, however, that the adverse determination
of the Commission on the reparation claim might not be
determinative not only of that count, but of the right to
damages as well? At all events, the court bolsters its decision upon all counts by reference to the provisions of the
Commission's order "that the complaint for reparations be
dismissed and the parties left to their respective remedies
at law." That the court apparently recognizes the conclusiveness of the determinations of the Commission is illustrated by language such as the following:
The present suit does not involve the same claim or issue as that
presented before the Commerce Commission and, therefore, the rule
that everything that might have been litigated is settled does not apply.
In order that the finding of the commission operate as an estoppel under
the other branch of the rule there must have been an issue decided
against appellant that is material to his right of recovery in the present suit. Such an order of finding does not appear in the record.

In Railway Express Agency v. Illinois Commerce Commission,5 15 the Illinois Supreme Court makes virtually ex
cathedra and without citation of supporting authorities a
statement of interest and perhaps of considerable future significance:
The order of the Commerce Commission granting the certificate of
necessity and convenience did not give petitioner a vested interest that
could not be changed by legislative enactment. It was the granting of
a privilege or license to do a certain thing issued by an agency of the
state in the exercise of the police power, and was subject to modification
or revocation.

The certificate of convenience and necessity referred to had
been granted to a motor carrier by an order of the Illinois
Commerce Commission, which was subsequently set aside
by the Circuit Court. While appeal from this decision was
pending, the Legislature transferred control of motor carriers from the Commerce Commission to the Department
of Public Works and Buildings.5 1 6 The Supreme Court now
holds that the proceeding has been thereby rendered moot.
In general, a fairly sharp distinction is recognized between the granting of certificates of convenience and neces515 374 IUl. 151, 28 N.E. (2d) 116 (1940).

516 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95

, §§ 240 et seq.

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW

FOR THE YEAR

1940-1941

sity and the issuance of licenses, the former being associated
with admission to public utility status and regarded as conferring contractual rights of a more or less exclusive character. 17 The Legislature doubtless has the power to create
for motor carriers to whom it grants certificates of convenience and necessity some status inferior to that protected one of other carriers and public utilities, and it is possible that such may be the policy in Illinois. 518 If so, the
statement quoted is justifiable. It would seem desirable, however, that some such explanation accompany a statement
so sweeping, and contain not only the reason for declaring
such inferior status but some clarification and definition of
the status itself.
An interesting bit of the aftermath of the Peoples Gas
case 519 was disposed of by the Appellate Court in Peoples
20 As a condition to the
Gas Light & Coke Company v. Hart."
granting of the interlocutory injunction in the original rate
proceeding, the company was required to deposit in the custody of the court the part of its collections allocable to the
portion of the rates in controversy. After the Supreme Court
had upheld the Commission's rates, and after refunding under a decree agreed upon by the Attorney General, representing the Commission, the Corporation Counsel, representing
the city, and the attorney for the gas company, certain customers of the gas company sought leave to file an intervening petition for the purpose of compelling the company to
pay interest at the legal rate upon the impounded funds.
Such leave was denied in the instant case. The court pointed
out that the statute"' requiring the gas company to pay
such legal rate of interest on funds required to be deposited
was limited to funds deposited for credit purposes, and held
that since such funds were in the custody of the court and
not subject to the company's use, the customers were en517 Frost v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 278 U. S. 515, 49 S. Ct. 235,
73 L. Ed. 483 (1929); West Suburban Transp. Co. v. Chicago & W. T. Ry.. Co., 309
Ill. 87, 140 N.E. 56 (1923).
518 see Egyptian Transportation System v. Railroad Co., 321 Ill. 580, 152 N.E.
510 (1926).
519 Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 373 Ill. 31, 25 N.E. (2d) 482 (1940);
notes, 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVmw 279, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 84.
App. 351, 34 N.E. (2d) 88 (1941).
520 310 Ill.
521 II. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ci 74, § 12.
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titled to receive only such interest, if any, as actually was
paid by the banks or other depositories.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The controversy between the City of Chicago and the milk
dealers over the selling of milk in paper containers produced
a carefully considered decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the troublesome problem
of requisite interest to contest constitutionality. 22 A manufacturer of machinery for the production of paper containers
and a manufacturer of such containers for milk each sought
declaratory judgments to determine the constitutionality of
a city ordinance alleged to forbid the sale of milk in such
containers within the city. Neither was considered to have
a sufficient interest to maintain an action.
The court began with the familiar language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Massachusetts v. MellonT25 and discussed the decisions of state and federal courts
in many cases. The policy underlying the requirement of
a sufficient interest was outlined, and it was said that the
effect of the ordinance upon plaintiffs was "incidental,"
"consequential," and "indirect" as distinguished from effects "direct" and "inevitable." It was said that inevitable
pecuniary damage is not the test; otherwise, the policy behind the requirement would be violated.
The difficulties inherent in the problem are caused partly by the use of such words as those inclosed in quotation
marks above. The court indicates, however, that a requisite
interest exists only where the ordinance or statute by its
terms restricts conduct of the plaintiff or affects the conduct
of some other person in entering into a relation with him.
In the case in hand, the only effect was to decrease the
market for plaintiffs' products, an effect to which the court
applied the terms "indirect" and "consequential."' 52 4
The doctrine of separation of powers was involved in
the decision in People ex rel. O'Meara v. Smith525 in which
Ex-Cello-O Corporation v. City of Chicago, 115 F. (2d) 627 (1940).
262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078 (1923).
The case is discussed and the problem is examined in a note in 35 Ill. L.
Rev. 983.
525 374 IM. 286, 29 N.E. (2d) 274 (1940).
522

523
524
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the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the statute which
vested exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages under
the Eminent Domain Act in the Court of Claims.5 26 Following earlier Illinois holdings the court decided that proceedings for the condemnation of property are judicial in character and that jurisdiction cannot be taken away from the
constitutional courts.
Due process of law, always a fruitful source of litigation,
seems to have produced only one noteworthy case, apart
from those involving questions of taxation. A 1939 amendment to the Pauper's Act, providing that no local government shall provide relief to any person who has not resided
within the territory of such government for a period of three
years immediately preceding his application for relief, was
upheld as constitutional. 527 The Supreme Court said that the
three years' residence requirement was reasonable as applied to persons who, although they had resided within the
state for the requisite period of time, were unable to meet
the requirement of residence within the local governmental
unit. The opinion lays large stress on the point that the state
is under no legal duty to furnish support for paupers and
hence enjoys a wide discretion in fixing eligibility requirements. The qualification in question was said to be in furtherance of a policy to restrict the influx of indigent transients
528
from other states.
Two. other cases involving constitutional problems may
be briefly mentioned here. In Clements v. Hughes, 529 Section 77b of the Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act of 1939530 was
declared unconstitutional. This section, which imposes a tax
of $25 on the registration of a new automobile brought into
the state by its owner if application for registration is made
within ninety days from the date of acquisition, was held to
be an attempt to restrict interstate commerce. In the case
of Cox v. Rice, 531 the Supreme Court reiterated the docIll. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 47, §§ 18 et seq.
People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374
Rehearing den. Dec. 10, 1940.
528 The decision and the policy and operation
U. of Chi. Law Rev. 544.
529 375 Ill.
170, 30 N.E. (2d) 643 (1940).
530 For a full treatment of the decision see
cHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIzw 286 (1940).
531 375 Ill. 357, 31 N.E. (2d) 786 (1941); note 30
526

527

Ill. 557, 30 N.E. (2d) 46 (1940).
of the statute are discussed in 8
a note by G. Maschinot in 119
Ill. B. J. 112.
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trine that a court order to a fiduciary to account for and
pay over fiduciary funds did not create a debt within the
constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt.

